Beginning in the middle of April 2011, several people who donated money through Yandex.Dengi to Aleksei Navalny’s RosPil said they were contacted by a female reporter claiming to work for “Sol’” newspaper. Bloggers have since identified the caller as Yulia Dikhtiar, a Nashi commisar in Voronezh. On May 2nd, this story developed into a full-blown scandal, when the print media and RuNet blogosphere linked the incidents to Yandex’s April 28th IPO on Nasdaq.
Meet Yulia Dikhtiar, gadfly of RosPil.
Later in the day on May 2nd, Elena Kolmanovskaia, Chief Editor of Yandex, announced that the FSB had indeed twice previously requested transactions information from Yandex.Dengi concerning Navalny’s account (the second request apparently targeted 100 specific donators).
Initially, Navalny was on vacation in Ukraine, whose apparently lousy Internet availability he blamed for being late to respond to the leak scandal. He was, however, able to make himself available for a Slon.ru interview the day after the story hit the headlines, on May 3rd. For the man who tweets at a hummingbird’s pace, it took Navalny 48 hours to mount a follow-up post on his LiveJournal blog. Despite this “vacation delay,” Navalny returned from Ukraine more fiery and accusatory than ever. Continue reading ‘Yulia Dikhtiar & the Persecution of RosPil’ »
“I don’t know why foreigners love to always photograph me in vests. A possible explanation is that, in every foreign article about me, it’s necessary to cautiously mention that my ‘general views are somewhat nationalist.’ To Europeans and Americans, the vest is a symbol of the four-eyed nerd. Maybe a “nerd-nationalist” is somehow less scary.”
~Aleksei Navalny, February 24, 2011
Who is this guy?
On April 4, 2011, the New Yorker published perhaps the longest, most detailed English-language analysis ever of Aleksei Navalny. Authored by Julia Ioffe, the article covers Navalny’s tumultuous personal past and his recent rise to political stardom in the Russian opposition. As Navalny himself noted with a certain exhaustion, Ioffe and the New Yorker staff hounded him for weeks, following him to the corners of Russia as he worked, phoning his relatives to fact-check the minutia of the article’s text, and generally “driving him batshit crazy,” as Ioffe put it. This might be the thoroughest, most intimate study of Russia’s hottest political figure today.
So what did it leave out? In a single word: nationalism.
Continue reading ‘Navalny’s Nationalism’ »
For anyone a member of or interested in the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), that group’s world convention is occurring this week at Columbia University in New York. Yours truly will be playing the role of Discussant for Panel R9 (“The Construction of Power in the Russian State”) this Saturday, April 16th, at 9am.
I’ll be discussing papers by four very talented scholars. Here’s the info from ASN’s final program:
These papers are works-in-progress, so I’m afraid I can’t publish my reviews at this time, but I encourage anyone in the area to try to attend. (It’s not free, I believe, though I doubt you’ll have to get through OMON_Moscow to find your way inside.)
"I know what I want, but I just don't know..."
In Russia these days, the sky seems to be falling even more than usual. In mid-March, INSOR (the Institute of Contemporary Development) came out with its annual report on Russia’s political future, advocating its patented brand of Medvedevian liberal reform. This produced the usual bubble of chatter, and would likely have faded into oblivion soon thereafter had TsSR (the Center for Strategic Studies) not released a similar study affirming the same findings. TsSR’s report matters more because, in Liliia Shevtsova’s words, it’s “people in the system going against the system.” When asked if his organization was ‘pro-Putin,’ Sergei Belanovskii (one of the TsSR authors) told Ekho Moskvy that he was just following the sociological evidence. (The evidence, it’s worth noting, apparently says that Russians demand an entirely new leader in 2012 — a third candidate!)
Now skip ahead to April 5th. Blogging at Bol’shoi Gorod, Oleg Kashin writes a bizarre, dreamy piece on Aleksei Navalny. The post is partly a nostalgic reminiscence about the simple old days, when Navalny was still tooling around for a movement or an issue to which he could hitch his wagon. (It turns out to have been RosPil and procurement corruption, not Narod and illegal construction.) Next, Kashin tosses out a Yeltsin analogy to explain how Navalny has become “the most popular non-establishment politician since 1989.” However, Navalny’s success will end soon, Kashin declares, arguing that ‘nobody really backs him’ because “nobody really backs anyone” (никто ни за кем не стоит). Navalny’s supporters will gradually turn into a sect, and newspapers will stop reporting on him. “Maybe they’ll send an intern,” Kashin offers charitably.
The next day, Kashin gave a lecture at Tsvet Nochi (a Moscow bar/club/restaurant place), where he told listeners that he expects the imminent territorial collapse of the Russian Federation. And, despite some seemingly absurd jokes about Siberia becoming an independent nation, it appears that Kashin was being serious. Continue reading ‘Oleg Kashin’s Manic Depression’ »
When the coolest nerds collide...
Roughly a week ago, a muckraking blogger and a scholarly nepotist got together with some other eggheads and talked for nearly four hours about in-the-works reforms for Federal Law 94, which is a beastly piece of legislation regulating government tenders. The law is made up of 65 articles, and has been revised several times since being enacted in 2006. Aleksei Navalny, superstar Internet sensation, activist lawyer, and all-around promising “new liberal” political inspiration, faced off against Yaroslav Kuzminov, provost/president/”rektor” of the Higher School of Economics and husband to Elvira Nabiulina, head of the Ministry of Economic Development. Continue reading ‘The Great Debate: Navalny, Kuzminov, & Friends’ »
The face, so to speak, behind the tweets. OMON_Moscow's avatar.
On January 13, 2011, an anonymous member of the Moscow OMON opened a Twitter account and began regularly posting opinions and factoids related to police work in Russia’s capital city. That Twitter account now has almost 3,000 followers, and the user himself is following 178 other tweeters — most of them high-profile RuNet bloggers. In what is an increasingly ordinary miracle of the 21st century, this faceless, nameless Internet presence managed to become a big enough sensation that Ekho Moskvy chief editor Alexei Venediktov took notice and offered to repost the results of a public Q&A that OMON_Moscow started on February 2nd. Using a LiveJournal account created parallel to the Twitter profile, Mr. OMON solicited readers for any questions they might ever in life have wanted to put to a real, live Moscow cop. He received almost 500 questions in less than two weeks, with thousands more to follow. They ranged from polite and genuinely curious to insulting and didactic. He answered all kinds. Continue reading ‘Whatcha Gonna Do When They Tweet At You? OMON_Moscow’s Public Q&A’ »
What will we be thankful for if this day ever comes?
On December 6, 2000, American businessman Edmond Pope was convicted by a Moscow court of espionage and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Even after the verdict, Pope did not confess to being a spy, and he refused to appeal to the Russian President for clemency. Nevertheless, a young President Vladimir Putin pardoned Mr. Pope eight days later and stuffed him onto a chartered plane back to the United States.
Roughly a year later, Putin issued Presidential Decree No. 1500, reforming the legal structure of pardon-review committees. The single Committee on Pardons that existed since 1992 (created by Yeltsin’s No. 17 Decree) was replaced by a system of regional committees scattered throughout Russia. Aside from laying the framework for these new review boards, Putin’s executive order also articulated a “procedure for submission of applications of clemency.” Article 3 of the executive order states bluntly: “A convicted person [must] petition the President in writing.” Just yesterday, Mikhail Barshchevskii (plenipotentiary representative of the Russian Federation in the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Higher Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation) made the following statement on this subject:
“…it follows that, in the absence of a petition from the convicted person [...], there are no legal grounds for the President to issue a pardon.” Continue reading ‘Pardon My Past: Khodorkovsky & Clemency’ »
In my last post about the Law on the Police, I dedicated a section to Aleksandr Khinshtein, whose opposition to the legislation I characterized as phony and predicated on bad blood dating back eleven years to a bizarre run-in with the MVD involving a traffic violation. A very knowledgable friend immediately wrote me to explain that Khinshtein’s relationship with the MVD is a lot more complicated than that. Thoroughly shamed, I’ve done some reading up on Mr. Khinshtein, and I offer the following text as a corrective on my previous representation of the man.
In 1999 and 2000, when Khinshtein was catching heat from the police, he was working at Moskovskii Komsomolets as a muckraking journalist. It was around this time that he targeted Vladimir Rushailo (Minister of Internal Affairs from May 1999 until March 2001) and a number of MVD senior staff in a series of exposés about corruption and criminal activity inside the police. For example, in an article from May 2000, Khinshtein told the story of Eduard Budantsev, an officer in the MVD’s organized crime unit who foolishly authored a report implicating Rushailo and his “righthand man” Aleksandr Orlov in accepting bribes, using police resources for commercial activities, and serving the private interests of various oligarchs (namely, Boris Berezovsky). Neither Orlov nor Rushailo were brought up on charges, whereas Budantsev was demoted and threatened with criminal prosecution himself. Continue reading ‘A Bit More About Aleksandr Khinshtein’ »