In the belly of the beast.
I’m reporting today from the twisted loins of the Westin Bonaventure hotel in Los Angeles, the site of this year’s national conference for the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES, formerly “AAASS,” or ‘triple A, double S’). ASEEES/AAASS, aside from being a hopelessly anal-sounding phenomenon, is perhaps the largest gathering of the world’s Russia experts. This annual march of the Slavicists brings together hundreds of bespectacled historians, political scientists, journalists, government representatives, and so on (not to mention hordes of impoverished graduate students) — all to discuss topics as arcane as “Varieties of Dialogism: Dostoevsky in Southeastern Europe” and broad as “Language Policy and Identity in Russia Over Time.”
Today, I’d like to offer my thoughts about a roundtable that took place Friday, November 19, 2010, titled “Old and New Media in Russia Today.” First to speak was Mikhail Mirny, an IREX representative, who addressed the overall state of Russian news media. His remarks were exclusively about “old” media, which is to say television and newspapers — the primary takeaway being that “there are almost no independent media outlets in Russia.” Next up was Professor Elena Vartana of Moscow State University (from the journalism department, no less — the source of those infamous, erotic calendars from a couple of months ago). Professor Vartana rather vaguely philosophized about the risks of citizen-led journalism, i.e., new media. Her main concern was the lack of professionalism among bloggers, whom, she worried, can’t be relied upon to uphold standards of objectivity or fact-checking. The third speaker, apparently added at the last minute, was by far the least informed. Professor X (I don’t remember her name and she wasn’t on the program) from Columbia University arrived late. Long pauses in her sentences indicated (to me anyway) that she either hadn’t given her presentation much thought, or considered the issue of Russian media so clear-cut and obvious that it warranted sighs and “know what I mean?” insinuations. In an attempt to instigate a discussion about the Russian blogosphere, Professor X referenced Harvard’s Berkman Center study, “Mapping RuNet Politics and Mobilization,” except she confused the study’s conclusions, mistakenly announcing that the research had discovered that Russian LiveJournal blogs are more polarized than American political blogs. Here’s what the report, which itself is hardly a breakthrough, actually says:
Taking into account the caveats mentioned above, we see enough evidence to hypothesize that the Russian political blogosphere is less polarized than the U.S. political blogosphere, both because there is less homophily among highly politicized Russians bloggers and because there are many active Russian bloggers who engage on political topics without ‘choosing a team.’ In fact, our qualitative view is that most Russian bloggers prefer to declare an independent intellectual posture, and eschew group affiliations. In contrast, most politically engaged U.S. bloggers are willing if not proud to declare affiliation with a recognized collective political identity.
Nobody corrected her, presumably because either no one had read the Berkman study or because no one actually cared about “new media.” The final speaker, Nadezhda Azhghikina, represented the Russian Union of Journalists. Ms. Azhghikina waxed nostalgic about the late perestroika period, when she first attended AAASS. “We knew that we [journalists] had won [the battle for free speech],” she said, to which she added, “but we didn’t win anything.” This introduced a long, sorrowful retelling of an aborted renaissance in journalism that visited Russia in the 1990s. She ended with an interesting synopsis of the paintball scandal in Chechnya from June earlier this year, when Grozny hooligans (perhaps members of law enforcement) drove around shooting paintballs at women who weren’t wearing headscarves. Azhghikina called the affair a successful merger of new and old media, wherein bloggers publicized the story initially (including posting video of the attacks), and traditional newspapers (first in the West, she said) picked up the story and made it such an issue that authorities launched an official investigation.
The audience’s questions revealed that most attendees (about ten people altogether) were themselves members of the (old) media. The first question was about Oleg Kashin, the unified support that rallied behind him, and the reality that the wider public doesn’t really care about journalists who are beaten up or killed for their reporting. Mikhail Mirny bizarrely responded that Kashin represented a kind of “every man” reporter, explaining that someone like Anna Politkovskaya was a “superhuman journalist, someone who was levels above everyone else.” Kashin, however, “is just like us.” This, I suppose, was meant to be some kind of praise for the bruised and battered Kommersant correspondent, who many would argue is a far more talented (though perhaps less ‘daring’) reporter than the murdered Politkovskaya.
The next question was about journalists who maintain blogs, and the dangers of airing personal opinions in the public space. This second question clearly captured the interests of the panelists, as they spent roughly thirty minutes debating the dangers of journalists polluting their work with revelations and diatribes about private beliefs. Professor X complained that these dangers prevented her from recruiting various American journalists for an ongoing Columbia project. Professor Vartana made the poignant observation that the risks of blogging are less in Russia, where openly opinionated journalism is already the standard.
The last question (which was more of an open-ended comment) came from a reporter at RIA Novosti (who, for some reason, circulated a questionnaire before the event asking people what they thought of russiaprofile.org). He shared an anecdote from his life in Russia that was meant to demonstrate the peril of Russian journalism. His story involved a Russian stable girl telling him that being a journalist meant “knowing a lot about celebrities,” meaning that Russians understand the media only in terms of the tabloids. Everyone laughed, and this started a twenty minute group lamentation about the trouble with infotainment.
I asked a question at this event, too. But before I get into that, let me lay out my criticism of the discussion more generally, so the reader understands the context. Every panelist basically preached gloom and doom for the present and future of journalism in Russia: Mirny openly claimed that there are no independent newspapers in Russia; Azhghikina got weepy about the journalists’ great defeat; Vartana cast aspersions on bloggers’ professionalism; and Professor X boldly misreported the results of scholarly research.
Describing the Russian media in these terms is fairly typical, but it was only during this two-hour event that I realized how the terms of the general discussion inevitably predetermine this alarmism. There was a rhetorical subtlety at work in this roundtable and it functioned like this: the speakers began by mourning the weak distribution numbers of Russian media outlets. “There is no newspaper with a national circulation,” one of the panelists reported. Claims like these induce the fear that access to information in Russia is weak. The remedy, presumably, would be to expand either the printing and availability of existing sources, or promote new publications to better link and inform the peripheral areas of the country. It’s to this initial point about limits to circulation that alarmists slyly add a second anxiety: that independent media is ineffectual. What this means is that journalists have difficultly influencing public opinion, which in turn robs them of the power to influence and manipulate the authorities. This, it turns out, is the real battle-cry of concerned journalists. The problem, I would argue, is that this position assumes the media’s fundamental purpose is some kind of missionary activism. When people ignore the work or the plight of — let’s say — the bus drivers, few would question the health of society’s democracy. The fact that Russian journalists are largely ignored and disrespected, however, does provoke such declarations about Russian democracy. This is because reporters think that their influence is the backbone of civil society, and nobody thinks this about bus drivers.
Mikhail Mirny
My point is specifically that reporters are less interested in circulation than they are influence. These two concepts are often conflated, as the former is a steppingstone to the latter, but they are distinct. Azhghikina’s remark about the media’s success in the Chechen paintball scandal is a perfect example of what represents reporters’ ultimate ambition: forcing the authorities to respond. It was on this note that I raised my question, which asked why the panel adopted its particular definition of journalism (which seemed more accurately describes civic activism). Citing the Chechnya paintball case, I wanted to know if a different example where the authorities did not react to the media was necessarily a failure. For instance, what about Alexandr Naval’nyi’s massive exposé about the $4 billion fraud at Transneft? Like the Chechnya paintball story, this was something uncovered by “new media” and afterward discussed and disseminated by “old media.” The news made it all the way to Vladimir Putin’s press secretary, Dmitri Peskov, who promptly told reporters to buzz off. Mirny was the only panelist to respond. He said it was a “qualified success,” emphasizing that more people learned about the issue (which was good), and concluded by saying that this didn’t contradict his position on what constituted successful journalism.
There wasn’t time for follow-up questions, but I’d like to argue here that, while Mirny may not have been contradicting himself, he was shifting the terms of the discussion when it suited him. The panel — Mirny especially — made the political weakness of Russian journalism its primary complaint. The issue of dissemination (“not enough people have access to independent reporting”) is basically a subterfuge for an agenda of influence and power. Journalists don’t just want readers: they want to be able to incite and mobilize their readers. They’re megalomaniacs, in a sense: driven to function as watchdogs of others with power, and deeply offended when people ignore their investigative reports, their op-eds, and their revelations. And they’re not fools. Ask them if it’s still good journalism when a story (like Naval’nyi’s expose) amounts to lots of chatter and no hard politics repercussions, and they’ll tell you (as Mirny told me) that — sure — it’s still good. You’ll get a line about distribution and circulation, with the implication that reporters just want important facts to be public information — that power and influence aren’t the aims of the media.
After the event ended, I approached Mirny to ask him how he could say that Russia has no independent media. I started to list the various online and print publications that regularly churn out oppositionist or otherwise irreverent material, and he interrupted me to declare, “Okay, I suppose there are about seven independent news organizations in Russia — but no more than ten.” He then said that these papers are largely economically nonviable, explaining how Novaya Gazeta, for instance, relies heavily on the private wealth of Alexandr Lebedev and Mikhail Gorbachev. This led to his recalling a small local paper in a provincial Russian town (I don’t remember the name), where he said a single newspaper was successfully launched with the help of an Arizona professor (he said this paper was one of the 7-10 “truly independent” media outlets in Russia). I asked Mirny how repressive the newspaper environment in Russia could really be if prominent members of the opposition (like Vladimir Milov) are able to score interviews and regular articles in an “elite” printed paper like Vedomosti. “Ah, but someone like Kasparov is published in The New York Times five times more often than in any Russian paper,” he answered. Not wanting to debate whether or not his math was accurate, I just asked him if he thought that said more about Russian or American journalism. “Of course about Russia’s!” he replied. “If more people in Russia could read his perspective, they’d undoubtedly take a greater interest.” He then denied that this was an ideological position, stating that he only sought the freedom of information. “It’s in the best interests of everyone that people like Kasparov and Milov reach a greater audience,” Mirny protested, adding, “and of course it’s in the interests of Kasparov and Milov, too.”
At this last comment, I nodded, for once in agreement.
LOL. Sounds like a depressing feast of prejudice and journalistic egomania – as per usual when these subjects are discussed at Slavicist conferences. Thanks for the account, was interesting to read.
It was on this note that I raised my question, which asked why the panel adopted its particular definition of journalism (which seemed more accurately describes civic activism)
I think that the reason why the panelists took this definition is because this has been Russian journalism’s historical tradition. There has never been a tradition of objectivity, it has always been about advocacy, even in the Soviet times. One scholar friend who studies journalism as civic activism in the 1970s once told me that journalists used their position to expose local corruption and malfeasance. Basically, if they got a lot of reader letters about corruption in a factory, they would write feuilletons about it. In fact, my scholar friend decried the fact that this civic activism is waning.
That said, it is too bad the panel spoke so dimly about the state of journalism in Russia. It makes me wonder if I’m reading the same press.
A lot of this, I think, is indeed about tradition. One admittedly superficial parallel that occurred to me is that between the 19th C Russian elite sitting around with their socially aware literature and lit crit (which required literacy, which the masses lacked) and the 21st C Russian elite sitting around with their livejournals et al. (which requires internet access, which – while I sometimes think it’s a mass phenomenon, given the diverse social backgrounds of my friends with odnoklassniki accounts – is apparently not such a mass phenomenon if one believes the stats).
Anyway, superficial as this is, there’s a catchy title in here for you historians: “From Thick Journals to LiveJournals: [insert long subtitle here]“.
An interesting case study of a tradition-minded Russian media figure (albeit not one who’s in opposition to the gov’t) is this guy – http://magazines.russ.ru/authors/k/kolerov/ – who has pretty legit bona fides as a historian of Russian literary and philosophical debates and as a “critic”.
PS – AGT, thanks for this post – I was very sad to have to bail on AAASS at the last minute this year, but this reminded me that if I had been there for all four days as planned I would likely have had moments of disappointment at various panels as you did at this one.
PPS – I think one way to combat this issue is clear: some of the people who both follow “new media” and produce it, and attend AAASS, should submit a panel proposal for next year. I think I’m barred from speaking since I bailed on my panels at the last minute this year, but it’s the only way. If you aren’t part of the solution, you’re part of the problem, right? There’s that civic activism discourse creeping in again…
Well aside from the overwhelming depressing and frustrating factor, I have to wonder: in what universe is print journalism where anyone would expect civic activism based reporting and pontificating anymore? I can’t tell if people are mad about Russian media or mad about it not being 1965 anymore. Small independent newspapers are not economically viable in Siberia? As opposed to? Even large mainstream newspapers are struggling to remain viable. Why do you need a provincial rag when you have the whole entire internet, for practically free?
If the alleged “lack of an independent media” is meant to suggest there isn’t enough criticism of the government and its policies, you’d never know from reading the Moscow Times or Novaya Gazeta. If it’s meant to suggest opposition parties don’t have their own captive network, staffed with avowed supporters who broadcast canned campaign messages or contrived nonsense as if it were news (yes, I’m looking at you, Fox), good enough, say I.
There is absolutely no reason – no reason at all – that a network must be independent in order to reliably report the news. Fox News couldn’t BE any more independent in terms of its mutually-beneficial relationship with the government; it DESPISES the government and is owned by a single very rich man, and you can’t believe a damned thing you see there. The trouble is, despite all the catchy slogans about the viewers being left to make up their own minds, nobody plays that game anymore. It would make absolutely no difference who owned a network if they actually reported only what they could substantiate, and kept opinion out of it unless it was clearly announced as an opinion feature – if they reported everything they learned, instead of leaving out stuff that made their favourites look bad or stupid.
Most bloggers don’t cite the work of other bloggers when they’re trying to make a case, because they’re well aware that blogs are opinion-based. What’s comical is that newspapers and television news sites are judged to be reliable and impartial, when they’re actually not much better than Wikipedia and in some cases a great deal worse.
As long as articles critical of the government abound in the Russian press – and they do – the function of an independent media, in the debased form we expect of it today, is being served. If every outlet reported everything it could prove and only what it could prove, it wouldn’t matter who owned the network.
For sure: in the US, there’re numerous examples of a subservient journalism to establishment views. This includes a politically selective crusader like approach to covering certain issues.
On former Soviet matters, consider the kind of Ukrainian and Russian views often getting the nod – relative to the views of most Russians and Ukrainians.
Like other venues, Wiki is a mixed bag, which should be judged on a case by case basis.
Pardon the so-called “whatboutism,” which is stated to shed relative light on how Russia is viewed.
This is a great post, very enriching look at the AAASS conference for those of us who couldn’t be there, but are still interested in the role of the media in Russia today. I like the point you bring up that the entire structure of the debate on media in Russia today focuses solely on the “lack of independent journalism” in the country as if it were a black and white issue. It is, of course, not necessarily one way or another. Even if 90% of Russians only ever got their news from state-owned media on TV or in print, they interpret this information in a way that has hardly been addressed by political scientists and scholars, who hardly ever take in to account the actual human element of this story. And I see an independent media thriving in the RuNet…but I still don’t know who is reading it. But I do, and it seems like you do too. Keep up the good work!
Well I suppose that “the lack of independent journalism” in Russia means the absence of steady access to TV channels first and most of all. ( At least that’s the major complaint that I hear from the opposition representatives.) Only about 30 percent of Russian population has access to internet, while the majority of Russians get their information from TV programs. And this majority is precisely the target of “independent journalism” I’d say, because all these great political revelations of the blogosphere don’t mean much. (A classical expression “storm in a glass of water” comes to mind.)What matters at the end, is people coming out on the streets to protest government actions, not sharing information on-line and writing sarcastic blogs, no matter how brilliant they are. And that’s what Russian opposition that laments “absence of independent journalism” craves so much I suppose – the access to TV channels, in order to “bring the truth” to the mass audience, that they can’t reach via the internet.For some interesting reason or the other they think that once this happens, they’ll get the kind of support they seek.
I don’t think however that it would be a case.
Only about 30% of Russians have internet acccess, but that grew (broadband) from 1.9% in 2004 to 31.8% in 2009. Growth is obviously rapid, and interest in international news is high. News sources that are obviously just talking-head propaganda will see their viewership fall off dramatically if this trend continues, and there’s every reason to expect it will.
http://blog.euromonitor.com/2010/06/russia-picking-up-the-pace-with-broadband-internet-.html
Mark, your optimism and enthusiasm are always refreshing, but I take the material you’ve provided with a grain of salt. Most likely that’s because you are young and I am old.;)
In this particular situation it’s not all that important that the number of internet users went from 1.9% to to 31.8% in five years. What’s important, is WHO and WHERE is getting it, when we are talking about internet as a source of information, not a source of “online advertising and sales.”
Even the market research on that site you’ve provided states that “Internet penetration is the highest in Moscow and St Petersburg” AND that “Internet rates in the Kamchatka region (in the Far East) were between 350-1,700% higher than in Moscow and St Petersburg in 2009.” ( Think who can afford such rates?)
That means that between Moscovites and folks in Siberia\Far East ( they are very politically active I’ve noticed as well) there is a vast country, where access to the internet is very limited. Not only that, but the kind of people that can afford computers are not necessarily the “target audience” of opposition, because a lot of them are well-do-to Russians that are already not happy with Putin’s government anyway. Their target audience is much wider – the kind that can take to the streets, and this kind of audience doesn’t use the internet or read newspapers too much. They do watch TV however, where opposition has little access ( particularly in the Russian Far East) and that’s the real reason why opposition laments about an absence of “independent journalism” in Russia. It’s another question that what they often perceive as “lack of information” among Russians is not a real reason behind the fact that anti-Putin mood is not as wide-spread in the country as they’d like to see it. Overall I’ve noticed that pro-Putin voice among Russians is often not as much “pro-Putin” per se, as “anti-opposition.”
A month ago, when I was visiting my family in Moscow, I was not surprised to notice pro-Putin ( and anti-Western) mood among the older folks, but what surprised me, is that my old friends who were quite pro-Western and free-spirited back in Soviet times, were very negative about opposition, connecting dots with the 90ies.
They were quite negative towards the West ( US in particular) as well.
PS. On a lighter note, here is something for you to watch – a Ukrainian, who is very popular among Russians, Orange revolution or not.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Du2ryzDirMA
Enjoy;)))))
I’d be quite happy if the trend against the dopey liberal opposition continued without the anti-Western sentiment being part and parcel of it, because the west doesn’t necessarily deserve it even if the western media does. To my mind, the USA under Bush was a thoroughly frightening country that seemed capable of anything, but before that it was a pretty reliable and sober neighbour, and seems to be trying to get back to that state – with the glaring exception of some of the crazy people in it. Fortunately, you can spot them easily because of their tricorn hats, swallowtail coats and muskets.
Mark, it’s not about Bush for a change – that’s number one, and number two – the opposition that identifies itself as “liberal” is not really “liberal” if we speak in political terms, but neo-liberal. Neo-liberalism as far as I remember was something that Clintons were promoting back in the 90ies; the result of their policy mixed with the actions of Russian crooked government were outstanding ( yes, I’ve been sarcastic) to say the least.
( Mark, don’t tell me that you are not aware of this
http://www.thenation.com/article/harvard-boys-do-russia
and what I find actually to be even more astounding and condemning – this old interview of Yavlinsky that I dug out from some archives.)
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/int_grigoriiyavlinsky.html
So as you can see, the anti-American mood ( and anti-western sentiment in general) in this case goes further back in time than just Bush presidency. Without good understanding of the nineties, it’s not easy to understand today’s political situation and the reasons behind Putin’s popularity. He knows how to strike a cord with a crowd, keeping the 90ies in mind. (The fact that he is crook himself and he is an inseparable part of the nineties is a different matter; people supporting him often deny it in downright irrational manner.)
So there is more than meets the eye when we speak about “opposition,” “independent media” and the rest.
PS. Verka Serduchka rocks))))));)
The Ukrainian clip was HILARIOUS!
“News sources that are obviously just talking-head propaganda will see their viewership fall off dramatically”…
Russian media are often dubbed in the Western media as not free, undemocratic, whatever. But they do not say that Russian media are lying.
In my humble opinion, the Russian state media are well suitable as a source of information. That means, if something is said, you can trust it. The problem of the Russian state TV is about what is left behind. So you need to read newspapers and blogs if you like to learn more.
Agreed – perhaps I should have worded it differently, and clarified, “IF a news source is obviously just talking-head propaganda, it will see its viewership fall off dramatically”. This would presuppose that what the source said was proven repeatedly not to be true. You can only take so much of what you like to hear, in spite of it proving over and over to be inaccurate, although people will listen to what they like to hear for a surprisingly long time in the face of nonsense. The liberal opposition, for example – if a particular news outlet were to report over and over that the liberals are making significant gains in the polls, those who support the liberals would be excited and engaged, and there’s always the possibility of it becoming self-fulfilling prophecy as it often has in the USA. But if there are repeated disappointments, even the faithful will stop listening. This would be equally true of state TV reports that suggested privatization was working when it could be demonstrated it wasn’t. That’s only an example – I’m not suggesting privatization isn’t working, because it hasn’t properly gotten started yet.
The people might not have the Internet access other countries do, but they’re not stupid – you can’t piss in their pockets and tell them it’s raining.
I agree with you, Mark. First, there’s a test by the common sense and man’s own life. Second, lies are easily exposed in this age. Even 0.01% of the internet penetration would be enough to expose lies, because of the word of mouth.
Unfortunately, we end up with propaganda wars at the level of usual people. It’s not fun to talk to an old friend, and take a load of anti-Putin propaganda instead of casual chat. Strong opinions, not substantiated with facts. Facts distorted beyond recognition. And the speaker doesn’t want to take any action to deal with what he’s talking about. What’s the point, then?
Personally, I agree to anything. I agree that Putin is evil, I agree that Russia must be strong, I agree that the Government is destroying the country, I agree that the liberals have destroyed everything and it’s the time to restore things. Strangely, it leaves my interlocutors satisfied.
Considering how you started off your last comment, I’m not sure how to take that.
“Arguing does not produce truth. It produces collective delusion that we refer to as truth.” (c)
I’m not insincere, just… uncertain about a lot of things. Any way, the power of a conversation is that of the arguments made…
No, Mark, I think I just haven’t told you my point precisely enough.
There are the people — friends, relatives — who are dear for me, and I would be very careful to discuss politics with them. I mean, like, a party or a family dinner do not need to be about politics? So I would avoid expressing my own views about politics. Even when I’m proposed a political opinion which differs from mine. May be I would politely agree to an opinion I do not share.
In the Internet, in most cases I do not risk ruining relationships that took years to develop. For me, the Internet is a free zone for political talks.
Hope this answers your concerns.
No, it was kind of a joke; you closed your paragraph by suggesting you just agree with everybody to keep the conversation light and superficial, but started it off with , “I agree with you…”
Some similarities to go along with dissimilarities. On one talking head American cable TV news show, someone regretted the many Americans who get their news from TV, with two Comedy Central shows ranking relatively high on this particular. Further regret was given to the amount of coverage given to Christine O’Donell (specifically on the matters of what she said or didn’t say years ago about witchcraft).
I don’t think that Fox News Watch has gotten better. How analytically great were P.J. O’Rourke’s recent appearances at RFE/RL? In one instance, he makes a general criticism of media and blogs without being specific. Shortly thereafter, he uncritically lauds RFE/RL at a piece posted at that news orgs.’ site. During one of the televised NFL games this past Thanksgiving, there were repeated characterizations of American troops in Afghanistan fighting for democracy. IMO, that take has the kind of element which has been attributed to Soviet media. It’s one thing to give a shout-out well wish to the troops in Afghanistan. Quite another to make a politicized statement of the kind mentioned.
On selective blinders, note this 2009 piece which I’m in general agreement with:
http://grahamstack.wordpress.com/2009/06/05/would-the-real-ukraine-please-stand-up/
The author says that many Russians are negative about Ukraine (particularly the Yushchenko presidential era) because of a slanted Russian language mass media. Downplayed is the thought of reasonably critical views of Yushchenko’s presidency, which don’t need special propping.
Note the author’s suggestion that many (suggested to mean many in the West) would be surprised at the considerable number of Ukrainians having a positive image of Russia. He doesn’t go into explaining that surprise – which to a good extent has to do with the kind of Ukrainian views typically getting preference in English language mass media.
A snickering yeah to this excerpt from the above post:
“The next question was about journalists who maintain blogs, and the dangers of airing personal opinions in the public space. This second question clearly captured the interests of the panelists, as they spent roughly thirty minutes debating the dangers of journalists polluting their work with revelations and diatribes about private beliefs. Professor X complained that these dangers prevented her from recruiting various American journalists for an ongoing Columbia project.”
****
The matter at hand can get overly subjective in a way that arguably reveals the limits within American establishment venues. Some “diatribes” and “polluting” appear more equal than others.
Note the earlier (in the above post) characterization of the very same Professor X:
“The third speaker, apparently added at the last minute, was by far the least informed. Professor X (I don’t remember her name and she wasn’t on the program) from Columbia University arrived late. Long pauses in her sentences indicated (to me anyway) that she either hadn’t given her presentation much thought, or considered the issue of Russian media so clear-cut and obvious that it warranted sighs and ‘know what I mean?’ insinuations.”
****
Not that every Columbia academic on central and eastern European matters is like Professor X. However, it’s fair to say that some questionable views are given a longer leash than others, which are arguably more valid.
Wonderful post and the perfect re-entry to Russian blogging in the post T’day haze: literary lemongrass and lime juice in my triptofan-induced coma! Many thanks for this!