A Response to Julia Ioffe’s “Happy Birthday, You’re Fired”
29 Sep 2010
Yesterday in Foreign Policy, the latest article by Julia Ioffe appeared on the subject of Yuri Luzhkov’s ouster. The piece, “Happy Birthday, You’re Fired,” makes for a good read, but I disagree with much of its content, and so I offer the following response.
Ms. Ioffe’s central thesis is that firing Luzhkov does nothing to boost the power of President Medvedev, and that the entire bonanza was the “dirty work” of Vladimir Putin. She argues that people are wrong to say that Medvedev won and Putin lost. “That explanation,” Ioffe says, “makes little sense, as does any that treats the presidency as a real contest between Medvedev and Putin, or a perceived split between the two as something other than political theater.”
This is a scarecrow argument insofar as it assumes the relationship between the tandem partners is a zero sum game. Characterizing this interplay as a win/lose scenario forgets the fact that Vladimir Putin himself gave Medvedev his biggest credibility boost of all by promoting him as his successor. In the last two years, Putin has never vowed to return to the presidency – something that is legally within his rights. Instead, he has only hinted at the idea and repeatedly waxed on about his good relationship with Dmitri Anatolyevich, with whom he says he’ll decide 2012 in private. The reelection of Medvedev, while far from predetermined, is a very real option under Putin’s consideration. That being reality, it’s over-simplistic if not foolish to dismiss the growth of President Medvedev’s influence on the grounds that it assumes his every advance comes at the expense of the Prime Minister. Medvedev’s gain is Putin’s gain, as it adds credibility to the tandem’s junior partner and preserves the choice ahead for 2012. Putin wants that choice, and he’s said so at every opportunity over the last year.
Ioffe seems to have embraced such cynicism about Medvedev’s potential in part due to conversations with a number of unidentified “government operatives,” whom she cites numerous times throughout the article. I’ve no doubt that many people in the halls of power are firmly convinced that Medvedev is nothing more than a presidential placeholder. But, as Ioffe herself acknowledges, the staff members of Russian politicians are also prone to obliviousness. Indeed, Luzhkov’s aides lined up yesterday morning to hand him birthday gifts, unaware that their boss had just been canned. “When they found out, many were stunned,” she writes. The game of quoting Kremlin insiders, incidentally, can be played both ways. This morning, Vedomosti reported, “by the words of a government official,” that earlier this summer Putin had promised Luzhkov that he could remain in office until his term expired in June 2011.
Ioffe also repeats an amusing line by Aleksei Chadaev (“in our Russian bureaucracy, trying to split the tandem is the deadly sin”), which conveniently pretends that Luzhkov was the first public figure to “split the tandem.” This is a rather strange argument to make, given that it was President Medvedev’s sudden and unexpected decision to halt construction of the road through Khimki Forest that jumpstarted the entire Luzhkov controversy. Yuri Mikhailovich is not the sinner, but the poor sod who dared to throw the first stone. Consider what Yulia Latynina (who, I confess, agrees with Ioffe’s overarching thesis) said about the whole scandal in a Novaya Gazeta op-ed today:
The scandal around Luzhkov didn’t start at all with Luzhkov, but at the moment Dmitri Medvedev, in Putin’s absence (while he was riding around the Far East in a yellow Lada), promised public opinion that he would reconsider the road through Khimki Forest. […] In the eyes of Prime Minister Putin, any kind of response to public opinion amounts to weakness, especially when the road through that forest is being built by Putin’s person friend, Rotenberg, and protesting against its construction is Putin’s personal enemy, Shevchuk.
And what of Ioffe’s claim that Medvedev did Putin’s dirty work? Here is what she wrote on this subject:
Instead, Putin determined that Luzhkov needed to go and sent in Medvedev to do the dirty work, a move that not only knocks out a powerful rival but leaves his hands unsoiled in what has become a bloody fight. “Putin wanted to stay in the shadows on this one, and he won by doing so,” a highly placed United Russia official told me. “Luzhkov was made into a cautionary tale; he was rather publicly and shamefully trampled. The elites surely won’t love Medvedev for this, and it will be hard for him to win back their love.”
Yes, Luzhkov was indisputably made an example of what happens when any official speaks out against the president, but why the sudden talk of “love”? While I don’t rule out that the Kremlin could be overwhelmed by the work of administering the city of Moscow (something Yabloko’s Sergei Mitrokin, of all people, zeroed in on immediately, uttering surprisingly kind words for Luzhkov’s social spending record), it seems absurd to speak of Medvedev’s need to make the Moscow elite “love” him. Whatever love has been lost has surely been replaced by something equally if not more impressive in Russian politics: fear. As for maintaining the good graces of Moscow’s apparatchiki and ensuring a smooth transition of power, neither love nor fear will eclipse the role of handouts, golden parachutes, and continuity. We won’t know more about the Kremlin’s plans for the future until later, but Medvedev’s interim appointment of Vladimir Resin to the mayor’s office indicates that he is sensitive to the needs of “love,” even as he castrates the city’s former boss.



Sep 29, 2010 @ 12:07:45
“Iosif Kobzon, Russia’s Frank Sinatra, with all the purported mob links but none of the talent.”
Seriously?
Kobzon doesn’t have any talent? I can name ONE person without talent.
Sep 29, 2010 @ 13:47:47
Who really knows for sure besides Putin, Medvedev and the people close to them? Unquoted inside sources can be motivated to anonymously spin a certain line, that’s not necessarily so true with reality.
From a distance and with some on the ground sources close and not so close to the Russian government, I sense that the answer is quite possibly somewhere in the middle of the idea of an independent Medvedev versus the thought of his being a complete or near complete front for Putin.
IMO, one shouldn’t lose sight of such situations elsewhere. This point concerns the Medvedev is a front perception. Western heads of state have to take into consideration influences pertaining to public opinion and powerful elements in government and the private sector. Numerous others have to do the same. A coach of a professional sports team is technically in charge of who plays and sits, as well as game strategy. He/she nevertheless might’ve to consider the preferences of the general manager and/or owner – especially if either or both of them are known for getting overly involved with team matters. At the same time, a number of influential folks (be they a prime minister, general manger or owner of a business) recognize the need for giving space to people who’re put in decision making positions for a stated purpose.
Luzhkov fell out of favor with Medvedev. Concerning Moscow, there’ve been recent talking point issues which can and have been used against Luzhkov – who has been mayor for quite some time.
The comeback to these comments might note how in the West, elected officials and private businesses have to take into account their respective constituency. In Moscow, is Luzhkov’s ouster being met with great opposition?
Sep 29, 2010 @ 14:02:25
I probably should have read Julia piece first, but alas …
* All this debate over the povody and prichiny avoids the simple premise that Luzhkov’s exit was inevitable. Putin has tried to reign in the once popularly elected governors and Medvedev followed suit. With a powerful premier like Putin there are few other important people the president can fire without extensive coordination. (Note that during this week Medvedev has added 1/ Investigation committee and 2/ Constitutional Court to this list)
Rossel, Shaymiyev, Rakhimov ….. Did anyone think that list would not continue with Luzhkov?
What’s more in all these cases the process was similar. Warnings => The use of the federal press to show the Kremlin is dead serious => negotiations => coordinated exit. Up until the finale, Luzhkov’s trajectory was identical. Why was everyone acting so confused? (rhetorical question)
** THE most important moment was when UR got nervous about Gudkov’s pro-Medvedev movement and announced their own pro modernization a la Medvedev campaign. In other words the partybosses had gotten the signal that they have to place some if not a lot of their eggs into the Medvedev basket. This probably happened after they realized Putin was not going to back Luzhkov. This doesn’t imply that either Medvedev or Putin has made a decision for 2012, it means UR is reorienting towards Medvedev. Their motive of course is self preservation. There is little as trustworthy an indicator in Russia-watching as self that.
So Medvedev did win big time this week.
*** Can we see possible trade offs for elite support for Luzhkov’s ousting? 1/ Giving the MVD another change to rework the Police law among themselves. 2/ delaying the process of creating a fully independent and unified bureau of investigation. So the ‘power ministries’ got something, meaning Medvedev showed them he is not just a liberal, modern face of the nation, but that he will also take into account their concerns about stability etc. Remember all the stuff written about Gorbachev’s meandering? Medvedev just made a relatively small reorientation and reemerged in the center, where the support and the power is. Coincidentally he was not eating hamburgers with Obama this time, but visiting powerhouse China.
In short, Medvedev has been very presidential this week. Anyone who wants to argue otherwise is just trying to come up with something original.
Poka, Joera
Sep 29, 2010 @ 14:37:59
Also, many commentators tend to compare Medvedev’s current clout to Putin’s clout anno 2010. That maybe useful to determine the power distribution in the so called tandem, it’s not very useful when estimating Medvedev’s potential. It took Putin 3-4 years to get rid of people like Voloshin and Kasyanov, who were installed to control him by his erstwhile puppetmasters.
I prefer comparisons like these:
(Not that these are not necessarily explanations I subscribe to myself, but they do exist in the realm of public opinion)
# To become president:
- Yeltsin abolished the Soviet Union,
- Putin started the 2nd Chechen war
- Medvedev launched a military campaign against Georgia
# To assert oneself as president (part 1)
- Yeltsin send in the troops against the parliament.
- Putin exiled and jailed insubordinate oligarchs
- Medvedev has replaced 28 or 29 governors and counting
# To re-assert oneself as president (part 2)
- Yeltsin gave away industrial assets, nominally belonging to the people
- Putin abolished direct election of governors
- Medvedev ???????
# To remain president
- Yeltsin gave the country to the oligarchs
- Putin enlisted the secret services to reign in the oligarchs, meanwhile ballooning the bureaucracy
- Medvedev is trying to enlist the people to reign in the bureaucracy.
So tell me whose doing the better job being President of Russia?
Sep 29, 2010 @ 20:14:23
Medvedev was elected as the President on March 2, 2008, while the 08/08/08 war started — right? — on August 8, 2008.
Regarding the popular claim that Putin started the Second Chechen war, I would like to point on Boris Yeltsin’s book of memoirs,
http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/ELCIN/marafon.txt
In that book (chapter “The Second Chechen [war]“) he commented on the timeline of 1999:
То, что ситуация в Чечне на грани, нам всем было ясно. … Мы
понимали, что ситуация может вступить в новую страшную фазу открытого
противостояния.
Назначение Владимира Путина исполняющим обязанности председателя
правительства происходило на фоне вторжения чеченских боевиков в Дагестан.
Оно началось буквально через два дня после моего указа.
….
Путин дал людям обеспеченные государством гарантии личной безопасности.
И люди поверили лично ему, Путину, что он сможет их защитить. Это стало
главной причиной взлета его популярности.
I.e., Yeltsin’s view is that during the spring-summer of 1999 the situation in Chechnya ran out of control of the local authorities (President Aslan Maskhadov). It was clear that the situation was on the verge of a war. Two days after Putin was appointed the Prime Minister, Chechen militants invaded a Russian region of Dagestan.
So, Yeltsin’s view is that Putin has coped well with the crisis which originated in Chechnya. So the Second Chechen war was a war of defense.
Of course, I do not mean that Yeltsin’s memoirs are the ultimate truth. But they form a consistent view made by a political authority. It surprises me that that view is absolutely ignored by people pretending to be Russia analysts.
Sep 29, 2010 @ 20:34:09
Evgeny
You beat me to ther punch on the first of these two opinions:
“- Putin started the 2nd Chechen war
- Medvedev launched a military campaign against Georgia”
****
For my own sense of clarity (which is definitely shared by some others), I’ll add that the 2008 war in the former Georgian SSR was provoked by the Georgian government’s strike on South Ossetia, which included the killing of Russian soldiers and civilians, who willingly see themselves as Russian civilians.
There’s an informal discussion regarding this and other related matters that include the suspect idea that Saakashvili was setup to enter a deliberate “trap.”
http://marknesop.wordpress.com/2010/09/02/an-uneasy-peace-a-foundation-of-sand/#comments
Kudos to Mark Chapman for prompting and hosting the subject matters in question
Sep 29, 2010 @ 20:57:44
Misha, actually, my view would be incomplete had I forgot to note that Yeltsin’s book of memoirs was translated into English as “The Midnight Diaries”,
http://www.amazon.com/Midnight-Diaries-Boris-Yeltsin/dp/1586480111
And the Western readers can enjoy the option of buying that book for — oh, “from $0.01″ for used one.
Sep 30, 2010 @ 03:00:47
Fair enough on the timing of Georgia conflict. It doesn’t really fit the header I put it in.
As to reasons for both wars, it’s not really my point to debate them. When a considerate number of people believes something, that opinion exists in the public realm, whether true or not.
The point i want to make is that when you compile a list of things the three presidents did to assert power, Medvedev tenure is rather mild. that’s something to take into account when assessing his potential/net worth.
Sep 30, 2010 @ 03:39:28
So far, Medvedev’s time as Russian president can be viewed as being more mild than what Putin faced in that position.
Though still problematical, Chechnya has calmed down. The 2008 war in the former Georgian SSR was an easier task than the second war of the last decade in Chechnya.
The issue with the oligarchs’ place in Russia has arguably calmed down.
Keep in mind the Medvedev-Putin presidential comparison is so far judging an eight year Putin presidency with Medvedev’s roughly two year (to date) stint as president.
This last point might very well relate to the idea of Medevedev believing that the time is ripe to start making more of a mark for himself.
Sep 30, 2010 @ 05:04:10
Misha,
I agree the conditions matter. I usually use the comparisons i made above, to show Russia has become much more stable. Still, i do say it also says something about the presidency of Medvedev and his personality. Of course he was chosen because Putin thought his personality fitted the conditions that Russia currently faces.
Putin must have realized that the stability he created came at the cost of a ballooning bureaucracy (or an increase of power of secret services, as some prefer to say). So he opted for a successor that could reverse that trend, although without creating a new monster.
Putin staying on as premier/guardian, ensured a situation for Medvedev in which he did not need to enlist his own troops. Despite the early talk about so-called civiliki, there simply is not such a group. (I also think the siloviki theory was taking into the absurd). At the same time this does create a situation in which large parts of the bureaucracy still act as if they are protected by Putin. So for now there is more of a stagnation of the trend, rather than a reversal. I assume Putin prefers it that way. Stability and such.
Medvedev fits the job. A continuous show of force is not in his nature. He is the bureaucrat that wants to show he can get things done, even when it takes quite some time. He was not flaunting his supreme command during August conflict, nor is he flaunting the ouster of Luzhkov. Although there must be enough PR people to tell him he should. I assume Timakova understands him, and that she is disliked for that reason.
Another interesting aspect of Medvedev is that he is trying to enlist the so-called active groups in society (Surkov speak) to beat the bureaucracy monster. This is a novelty. Of course, Yeltsin and Putin also used the people. Putin has presented himself as protector of the poor, the workers and pensioners (apart from monetization of lgoty). Yeltsin spoke to the people who wanted the opposite of communism: democracy, civil society, whatever that was. In both cases the use of people/society/the electorate has been rather passive. Medvedev needs ‘active groups in society’. (Note how Surkov doesn’t want to say civil society to avoid association with ‘empty’, western terminology)
The problem is of course that apathy and cynicism are still predominant. It is easier for a president to to enlist the army, the oligarchs or the secret services to execute ones agenda. Medvedev is still trying not to. I find that rather remarkable and praiseworthy, while noting he wouldn’t be able to do so, not having Putin as a guardian.
It does remain to be seen what Medvedev will do after a possible re-election and continuous apathy coupled with inconstructive oppositionist activity on behalf of society. He may run out of patience eventually.
Sep 30, 2010 @ 05:45:07
Joera, your observations are in line with the opinion that Russia’s economic and political development will be a prolonged matter as opposed to a situation achieving a quicker result.
I’m not so much concerned with Russia “misbehaving” (for lack of a better term) globally, as opposed to how the domestic situation in that country develops.
The West can and should play a positive role. The issue is how. The West can also negatively influence Russia.
McFaul and Brzezinski are on record for saying that Russia (as they put it) will be okay in the long run. The concern is with what could happen in the short term.
As optimistic as M & B are for the distant future, I find some of their views of the short term to not always be so agreeable. As you know, they aren’t alone.
Sep 30, 2010 @ 05:59:54
Sorry Misha, i don’t understand your comment. You write you’re interested in the domestic situation, so why you bring in McFaul or Brzezinski in to this conversation? BTW I live in Amsterdam and don’t care much about both men.
Sep 30, 2010 @ 06:06:08
I mention them relative to some influential Western perceptions that can for better or worse have some bearing on how things play out in Russia.
I say this without meaning to overrate what the West can do.
Sep 29, 2010 @ 16:02:18
I can conceive of no more damning indictment of one’s “thesis” than to say Yulia Latynina agrees with it.
What amazes me is that, after all the agitating Julia Ioffe did to have Luzhkov kicked to the curb – even referring to herself as a “one-woman campaign” – she can’t manage to simply report his much-anticipated dismissal without trying to get in a dig against Medvedev and puppetmaster Putin. I particularly loved the part where she characterizes the effort to oust Luzhkov as a “vicious Kremlin smear campaign”, after herself referring to Luzhkov variously as selfish and a thug, and his spokesman as an asshole.
As I’ve mentioned before, Luzhkov just got too full of himself and began to imagine he was invincible. He was deliberately insulting to the President and unrepentant when called on it. He practically dared Medvedev to fire him. Considering he will spend his rapidly-advancing dotage with the country’s richest woman, I’m finding it difficult to muster any sympathy.
Sep 30, 2010 @ 02:47:00
Thanks for the follow-up Evgeny.
Venues like this one can be quite informative.
A good deal of pertinent material isn’t translated and communicated abroad en masse.
Oct 02, 2010 @ 14:37:57
Probably, that book has slipped out of attention of Russia watchers, because it was published in 2000, BEFORE all the new cold war stuff. For me, it makes it more precious, more valuable — historic. I remember reading it in high school. That time I couldn’t have guessed that conspiracy-theory interpretations of the Moscow Apartment Bombings would become a matter of international politics (all the McCain stuff). May be, those folks could have a look at the book authored by Yeltsin, who according to them was all so positive and pro-Western, and who made it clear that the 1999 bombings were an act by North Caucasus separatists.
Oct 02, 2010 @ 16:39:30
Hang on as the the new Cold War point you mention might be gradually declining in the form of a fluctuating bar graph of up and down trends, with the negative trend gradually decreasing over the course of time. In the meantime, expect some periodic rumblings.
I haven’t bought into the conspiracy theory of the Moscow apartment bombings, which has been accepted by some observers, who’re not known for being “Russophobes.”
The Russian government didn’t need a risky (if caught) pretext for the second war of the 1990s in Chechnya. There was a basis for the first war as well. This last point is made while acknowledging the bad planning of that first war, which contributed to considerable suffering – as well as not being one to take the role of a chicken hawk from a safe distance.
At least from what I’ve seen, the evidence linking the Russian government to the Moscow apartment bombings is circumstantial, with a valid reason to second guess.
Oct 23, 2010 @ 12:48:54
I think the only thing Ioffe got right, and only then partially, was that it was a message to the moscow elites. That getting rid of Luzhkov was a signal, it was a signal to the whole of Russia and its 89 regions that a change is gonna come (as Otis Redding would have put it). Firing the odd regional governor hardly sets the boots quaking but taking down a big boy like Luzhkov does. Imagine what message it would send with Myedvyedev going in to the Presidential elections promising to deal with corruption with Luzhkov still in place. It is simply untenable. Myedvyedev needs the voters to believe that he will succeed and it is not just a reshuffling of chairs and more of the same, words, a bit of action here and there, but no significantly measurable improvement to the citizen.
It is also surprisingly logical in the ongoing plan to rebuild Russia on which both Putin and Medvyedev agree which I think goes as such:
1: Stop existential threats to the integrity of Russia (2nd Chechen campaign/’pacifying’ the Caucasus. On this point, one major issue still baffles me. In 1993 Tartarstan was also pushing for independence but ultimately made a deal to stay within Russia as opposed to chechen representatives. This deal was up for renewal after ten years (methinks) but I have yet to see anything on it, whether it is a simple renewal, new terms agreed or just abolished consentually. Either way, the risk of disintegration is effectively nixed.
2: Control of the economic sphere, i.e. the emasculation of Oligarchs who do not ‘take the deal’. It is hardly separate from control of the political sphere. Add to this economic reform, the 20% flat tax rate being a master stroke on many levels.
3: The fight against corruption, Medvyedev’s central tenet of his premiership and also when he becomes President. This is where we are today. Breaking the power of ingrained regional elites/family mafia and shutting down their little earners (like the grey import of cars in Vladivostok) and removal of direct elections for the regions. Both Putin and Myedvyedev understand very clearly that to keep the foreign investments rolling in, they have to get serious about corruption and not just because they read the Financial Times.
4: Political liberalization, but measured as necessary, which I think is probably a decade or so off.
Face it, Putin and Myedveydev are like Scooby-Doo and Shaggy a la russe. Don’t ask me which is which but there is not even a rizla’s difference between them on the substantive issues. Or even maybe Batman and Robin, something I would pay to see them dressed as. Different and clearly distinct roles. Luzhkov simply had to go sooner or later.
Nov 02, 2010 @ 14:14:17
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/fray-between-putin-and-medvedev-to-get-uglier/421473.html. So…. what are your thougjts about this then))