Whoops!
President Medvedev apparently informed Viacheslav Volodin, a top United Russia party official, at least a week ago that he intended to rid Moscow of Yuri Luzhkov. Volodin told Gazeta.ru, “The President’s decision wasn’t discussed. It was fulfilled.” At 8AM this morning, it was indeed. (See Presidential order here.)
I certainly called this one wrong. On a personal level, I’m very glad I was mistaken. As a ‘Russia Watcher,’ whoops! Everyone else: 1, AGT: 0.
One wonders now what’s to come next: The mayor’s immediate replacement, Vladimir Resin, is actually a few months older than Luzkov (both were born in 1936!). Until today, he was his First Deputy Mayor. This is a transitional appointment, and someone else will be anointed next year, when Luzhkov’s term would have been up. The mayor may have blown his chance to get an ally made his successor, or he may get somebody along these lines despite his poor sportsmanship, in order to preserve peace among the Moscow elites. Politolog Evgeny Minchenko thinks that, at a minimum, criminal charges against Luzhkov are on the horizon.
As Jesse Heath (who admirably saw this coming a long time ago) at The Russia Monitor has already pointed out, skeptics about Medvedev will rush to argue that Dmiti Anatolyevich was merely an assassin hired by Vladimir Putin. Indeed, people immediately highlighted the fact that Medvedev told Putin about his decision to fire Luzhkov before he actually did it. This, it will be claimed, was Vladimir Vladimirovich handing down the order or the permission to go ahead. Or perhaps it was President Medvedev merely conveying a piece of information. We weren’t present for the interaction (however it occurred), so it’s impossible to know how it went down. We will all be keeping a close eye on the nature and tone of their “blood brotherhood” in the coming days.
I agree with Heath that this is further evidence that Putin will not be returning in 2012 as president. Before Luzhkov’s ouster, I believed that, while not planning a return, Putin wanted to at least keep the option open and the future opaque. But I also thought that allowing Medvedev the boost he would obtain by dismissing the Moscow mayor was something Putin couldn’t stomach. Given his silence on the Luzhkov affair (and his apparent approval, until we learn otherwise), it is clear that Russia’s Prime Minister realized it would actually limit his 2012 options to diminish Medvedev by keeping Luzhkov. Assuming that Putin would have preferred not to arouse such a speculation game about 2012 a full two years prior, I would guess that Vladimir Vladimirovich did not plan this ouster. The important thing though is that, when faced with a chance to either reiterate his political dominance (by defending Luzhkov or firing him himself) or allow his tandem partner the political spotlight with a high-profile dismissal, Putin chose the latter. By ousting Yuri Luzhkov, Dmitri Medvedev takes a step closer to becoming United Russia’s 2012 presidential candidate, and Vladimir Putin takes a step back.
On the flip side, doesn’t a seemingly stronger Medvedev backing Putin in 2012 better serve the latter? (The thought behind this question is based on Medvedev appearing politically stronger by firing Luzhkov, with Putin considering a 2012 presidential run, with Medvedev’s support.)
In the meantime, doesn’t Putin’s non-involvement (at least on the record) of Luzhkov’s firing serve as cover in the event that the move somehow backfires, while also arguably serving to bolster the image of a strong Russian president, whose prime minister is on board with him?
Putin doesn’t need Medvedev’s support, should he decide to run again in 2012. Neither does the Russian presidency need some kind of empowering great act to cement the authority of the office. (The Constitution is already a very executive-empowering pillar of the federal government.)
If Moscow breaks out into some kind of internecine war of the apparatchiki, I’m not sure ordinary Muscovites would hold it against Medvedev (or Putin). We’ll see what happens now. I just heard on Ekho that Moscow entrepreneurs don’t know whether to fear for their businesses or rejoice that new opportunities have just opened up. I don’t know either. Either way, Medvedev looks a lot more serious by giving Yuri Mikhailovich the boot.
My thoughts on this subject (from 23rd September): Putin wants to run against Medvedev in 2012 to gain enhanced international legitimacy.
All the best,
Mr. D.
http://democratist.wordpress.com/russia-2012-towards-an-all-new-and-improved-simulacrum-of-democracy/
Democratist, it seems you have the support of Sean (see below). As for me, I don’t see the great need for a presidential race (however managed) in order to achieve “international legitimacy.” I’m not saying it’s impossible, but Putin has never, to my knowledge, indicated that he feels the legitimacy of his popular support is at all in question. Westerners have a habit of exaggerating the importance of their good graces when analyzing the priorities of Russian political figures. Yes, foreign investment and quiet borders are important, but it is cold, hard profits and power projection that will attract the Royal Dutch Shells of the world and repel the ambitions of Russia’s peripheral opponents.
Putin has stated explicitly that he and Medvedev will not compete in an election. As he’s cautious if he’s anything, I don’t suspect Putin is lying. Now that he’s fired Luzhkov, Medvedev and Putin will have all the more to talk about when they finally sit down together to discuss which one of them will run on United Russia’s ticket in 2012.
A follow up question to you: if the two tandem members faced off in 2012, would Medvedev be the one to run outside United Russia? Would he get a new party? Do you see any existing infrastructure for such a stunt?
“Westerners have a habit of exaggerating the importance of their good graces when analyzing the priorities of Russian political figures.”
or a changed version:
“Westerners have a habit of exaggerating the importance of their opinions when analyzing the priorities of Russian political figures.”
****
I’ve considered that thought regarding how Russia considered the ramifications of recognizing Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence.
Specifically, the PR issue concerning the greater number of countries recognizing Kosovo’s
independence (influenced in large part by the combined clout of the leading Western countries plus Turkey, as well as the lobbying eforts of Albanian nationalists over the decades).
Another view was what one Russian with Duma ties had privately suggested. According to him, Russia’s independence recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was an example of Medvedev being given clearance as president to make the call – which (in the view of the person making this claim) showed foreign policy inexperience. According to this person, Putin wasn’t so gung ho on the independence recognition.
On the other hand, that diplomatic move has been popular in Russia (especially when first announced).
The popularity factor will ultimately influence the discussed issue of 2012.
Underscoring the excerpted thought at the top, Russian leaders are understandably more inclined to act on the general mood in Russia, which at times can be different from what’s evident elsewhere.
Whether East or West, one can find examples of this mindset elsewhere.
The legitimacy point reminds me a bit of a recent reference of Shevtsova’s likening of Putin to Il Duce, when the comparison with De Gaulle is (in the opinion of some) the better analogy.
Offhand and without quoting Putin verbatim, he suggested a 2012 presidential run on his part.
At last notice, Putin hasn’t quashed that notion.
For now, the most agreeable point on the 2012 election is (perhaps) the idea that there will probably not be anyone else with a shot at the Russian presidency besides Putin and Medvedev.
Indeed, people immediately highlighted the fact that Medvedev told Putin about his decision to fire Luzhkov before he actually did it.
What a strange argument for some to make. It would be strange if Medvedev didn’t inform his Prime Minister that he was going to sack Russia third strongest politician.
Hopefully, Lukhkov’s ouster will quell all the Medvedev as puppet nonsense.
I wouldn’t be surprised if Putin and Medvedev square off in 2012. I’ve felt for a long time that Kremlin Inc wants to create a stable two party system. A showdown between the two would further that project.
Would Medvedev get his own party? Do you see evidence of this happening now? I’m skeptical.
What about Just Russia:
http://www.interfax.ru/politics/txt.asp?id=156568
I know it is an ancient theory, but they do seem to be getting some legs of their own, and are certainly distancing themselves from UR.
Gennady Gudkov is leading the “Russia Forward!” movement that is supposed to favor Medvedev, presumably in 2012. It’s not exactly the A-team, though. United Russia posted on its website this comment by politolog Aleksei Chesnakov:
That doesn’t sound like well-coordinated political theater to me. It also doesn’t sound like Medvedev has some kind organized anti-Putin support. I don’t think we’re at that point, nor do I expect it to come to that. Ideally, for the sake of smooth transition and tranquility, Putin and Medvedev will preserve their working relationship as is and Dima will remain president in 2012, giving Putin a smooth six years to recede from politics. I think this is certainly something he’s considering, at least.
Two-party systems are messes these days. Democrats and Republicans are more interested in scoring points than challenging the elites that are entrenched in both. They both have their origins among the elites, though, so it does not matter how they started. As soon as Whigs disappeared, the industrialists went to the Republicans. Then in the 1960s the two parties flipped bases.
I would not want Russians to have this because political systems should limit how much the wealthy can control it. Khodorkovsky bragged that he owned most members of the Duma, and his defenders cannot explain how undemocratic and illiberal this was.
If you discover a political system that doesn’t perpetuate and serve the wealthy, I hope you’ll share with the rest of us!
This is has been the million dollar question. Granted Putin joined UR out of the blue, though his affiliation was well known. I would think that Medvedev would have to join some political party, Just Russia being the most obvious one. There has been speculation for a while that he might do that, regardless of whether or not there is any information pointing to it.
But we all know that political parties don’t really matter in the Russian setting. Medvedev need not be a member of a party, and in fact he could position himself as above parties. That however leaves the question of funding. One idea is that United Russia could just split. If their political clubs are of any substance, then they could form the ideological basis for two parties.
I’ve always felt that a two party system would create a semblance of symbolic stability for Russian politics. And one thing Putin has achieved is that there is a political consensus with politicians being more liberal or conservative.
That certainly sounds like a very enlightened course of events, and I suppose it will become clearer in the coming months who among the EdRossy elite is willing to stand behind Medvedev, if he considers a presidential run outside the party.
All this still assumes that (a) Putin will either go back on his oft-repeated promise to decide this in advance with Medvedev, before anyone announces candidacy, or (b) Medvedev will give Vladimir Vladimirovich the finger and run even without his pal’s consent. I find both of these scenarios hard to believe right now. I think today’s Luzhkov ouster doesn’t predetermine 2012, but it does preserve (indeed it enhances) Medvedev’s reputation and credibility. That just makes the 2012 decision a real decision. Putin has done himself a great service: his successor is learning to act like a leader, which is precisely what Putin needs if he’s to exit politics — gradually and quietly.
That’s my read on Putin’s intentions, at any rate. I could be wrong and perhaps Putin went along with the Luzhkov affair because he became a prisoner of the process or because he himself initiated it. I’ve been wrong before. (See headline of this post).
I am really interested in the reasons for and manner in which Luzhkov was ousted.
Clearly the President has far-reaching powers, and clearly Luzhkov did not have a solid base of support. His firing was both within the law and in sync with popular demand.
That said, can the President go and fire any elected subordinate without giving any reason other than he’s lost confidence in them? Sounds rather vague. It is one of those laws in which, when a discriminating, responsible leader uses – one feels grateful for … but it’s rather open to abuse, no? Don’t people oppose authoritarianism on principle?
I ask because… Well, many people have hailed Medvedev as the harbinger of democratic reform, and I mean democratic by Western standards. However much we’re all happy to see Yuri go, it seems this would not fly as a democratic act in America, even if the President hypothetically had such jurisdiction. Dima’s act was populist, yes. Heroic to some. And probably welcome by most. But democratic? I am just trying to imagine an identical scenario circa 2007. I think the dialogue would be inverse: instead of focusing on the ends (yay! Luzhkov is out! The President is the Man!), we’d be freaking out about the means (OMG what kinda scary authoritarian country is this?! When will Russians ever learn how to be a democracy? How can they when they rely on the President to step in and fix everything?)
How would this discussion be different if Putin had officially fired him? Would we be as impressed, or cynical?
Some observers actually are playing up the undemocratic nature behind the ouster. This seems to adhere to a “Russian federalism is dead” narrative.
The opposition is responding somewhat in parallel, changing gears from ‘Luzhkov must resign!’ to ‘bring back direct elections!’ This has been happening for the last few weeks now, as Luzhkov’s ouster became more certain and organizers anticipated the need for phase two of their grand scheme.
The real cynics here, it seems to me, assume that it was Putin who really fired Luzhkov, and that Medvedev was just the messenger. This isn’t impossible, I’d argue, but it is unlikely. I do think Putin consented in the end, of course. He realized that to defend Luzhkov would mean the destruction of Medvedev’s political strength — something in which Putin is deeply invested, despite rumors to the contrary.
Incidentally, I highlight the following exchange I heard this morning on Ekho, which I think does a good job purging this event of ‘democratic values’ content, and instead places it firmly in the context of power:
I can’t see anyone successfully arguing that Luzhkov is a posterchild for democratic values. But that’s rather beside my point.
Agreed, though the man did come out in 2008 in favor of returning to direct elections for governors and mayors like him. He promptly quieted down about it, but the interview with Pozner is on YouTube for all to see. And, no surprise, he cited it on the first page of his letter to Medvedev, which The New Times published today. (Luzhkov is very loudly employing democratic rhetoric in the letter, incidentally.)
If we accept that this was a “conflict of the apparatus,” then do you think that whoever gets Luzhkov’s seat will have to purge out his tail? I assume that a large section of the Moscow chinovniki would have to be removed too.
I’ve no doubt that members of the Moscow Politsovet of United Russia, particularly Elena Panina, are tugging at their own sweaty collars right now. It was just a couple of weeks ago that the fools issued a public statement of support for Luzhkov, after all. Now, there’s nothing preventing chinovniki like this from simply pledging loyalty to a new mayoral overlord, though, from the perspective of the vlasti, their reliability is somewhat diminished.
The real losers will be the various people who benefit from good placement and connections within the Luzhkov rents and subsidies network. Inteko will clearly suffer the worst, but just imagine what 18 years of kickbacks and handouts has done to the economic waterways of Moscow. Everyone from public servants to fat cat apparatchiki are wondering what the hell tomorrow will bring.
This raises another issue, one we’re currently dealing with in Chicago (sorry, but there are real similarities): With the autocrat out, does anyone else actually know how to run the city? “Everyone from public servants to fat cat apparatchiki are wondering what the hell tomorrow will bring.” But, to the extent that anything actually runs, these are the people who make it run. I don’t know what the fine people of Moscow think, but here the citizens are also wondering what the hell tomorrow will bring. There may be opportunity for reform, but many are bracing for at least one term before someone rises from the heap of incompetents- public servants who are used to acting on orders or doing things on the down low, who now have no marching orders to follow or go-to man for a sweatheart deal, and opportunists- movers and shakers elbowing each other for a seat at the newly set table. Here we have a saying, “We don’t want nobody that nobody sent.” Almost everyone working for the city, officially or not, has been sent. A once in a lifetime window has opened through which the unsent may now crawl through. But there is no guarantee they will be better. Just newer.
I was going to mention Chicago, because what is the best way to remove a political machine when democratic means fail every time? The national guard? USSC?
If democratic means fail, why should they be removed? Personally, I am for the democratic method of removal. If someone remains in office election after election, there is either support of the majority (however duped or apathetic or otherwise fallible they may be) or lack of viable alternatives. And you know, for all the talk of keeping alternatives from becoming viable, I don’t think that just anyone is capable of running these things. So there is enough blame to go around for the lack of alternatives.
As for getting rid of machines … will they disappear with Luzhkov and Daley? Or will the monster just grow a new head? It’s not like they invented the patronage system.
The whole integration crisis in the required force from the federal government. Southern politicians who disobeyed were elected again and again. There was no other way to break that pattern.
Mraz
Several years back, when local autonomy was decreased in Russia, I suggested a loose comparison on the fine line concerning a responsibly strong federal government and reasonably applied states’ rights in the US.
For some, states’ rights has been a kind of code for abuse. At the same time, it’s not ideal to have an overbearing center doing unreasonable things.
The first few years in post-Soviet Russia saw areas with the greatest autonomy being among the most abusive on civil rights and some other issues.
Russia is still developing.
Of possible interest:
http://mat-rodina.blogspot.com/2010/09/fall-out-of-fires-end-of-political.html
From what’s been presented elsewhere, it seems like there’s a balance of some concern on how Luzhkov was replaced, along with a basis for seeing him removed from office.
You’ve got a friend in Yabloko’s Sergei Mitrokhin, who puzzled people today when he had some surprisingly warm words about Luzhkov’s support for ordinary Muscovites:
I’ve seen headlines elsewhere that teachers (like Mitrokhin mentions above) and cops (whom he doesn’t mention) are currently very concerned about what to expect in the near future. Unpredictability and suddenness were things Putin rarely forced on the citizenry. Now, like mystery meat from middle school cafeterias reappearing at a university mess hall, it’s back on the menu and everyone in Moscow has to take a bite.
From what I see, Yabloko is split on this issue ( Luzhkov) – they even contemplate such possibility as him joining Yabloko, lol.
Another thing – I don’t think you got it wrong ( as in “AGT got it wrong”)
I believe it was Putin who miscalculated his move ( yes, Medvedev was just a convenient messenger, no matter what personal disagreements he might or might not have had with Luzhkov)
Yes, Putin made a mistake and this dismissal of Luzhkov might bring the dire consequences for him on the political scene.
After all, Luzhkov ( as Putin himself) comes from the *pre-democratic* Soviet times. (So do many other *siloviki* on Putin’s team.) Both Putin and Luzhkov made their fortunes back in the nineties ( or at least built the foundation of it.) There might be more connecting them ( and others) then meet the eye.
As for Medvedev and his “modernization” plans – only naive idiots can believe them as far as I am concerned.
It is better to have predicted and called it wrong, than not to have predicted at all.
Luzhkov’s firing boosts investor confidence:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-29/medvedev-yields-near-low-on-confidence-after-luzhkov-ouster-russia-credit.html
It’s not over till it’s over.
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20101116/161363496.html
It’s going to be interesting. Very interesting.
( They shouldn’t have fired him, really…)
AGT,
I wonder if Democratist’s prediction is possible now that President Medvedev recently stated in his video blog that Russian politics is ‘in danger of stagnation’ calling for more political rivals to reduce United Russia’s dominance? Are the political elites trying to form two equally powerful blocs, ‘cosmetically’ at variance but actually with similar agenda – one centred upon a civiliki-centred Medvedev and a siloviki-centred Putin – one ‘modernization and partial liberalism’ the other ‘stability and partial conservatism’? If that is the real aim…a ‘top-down’ political plurality(or rather, duality) – wouldn’t it better that both groups have mixed civiliki-siloviki backers because there is danger that it can turn to cahos if it’s deemed purely civiliki vs siloviki. At least, I suspect the siloviki will not allow the civiliki to topple them without a (potentially damaging and ruthless) fight.
sinotibetan
While I am reading about the possible split of tandem and following implications,
http://www.politcom.ru/print.php?id=11747
I can’t help but to come back to the firing of Luzhkov. I still can’t believe that Putin ( for whatever reason) made such a huge tactical mistake. ( Yes, because it was so huge, I couldn’t believe till the last moment that he would go for it.)
Now I am reading THIS in Guardian, saying to myself “that’s precisely what I thought at that point in time and yes, apparently the prediction is coming true, for better or worse…”
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/sep/28/beware-friendship-moscow-russia-medvedev-putin?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487
“Even if the allegedly corrupt, enormously wealthy Luzhkov goes quietly, the affair could still backfire on the relatively liberal-minded Medvedev, the interlocutor of choice for many western governments. “It is the first genuine crisis faced by the system of power that was created by Putin – because a schism in Russia’s ruling party could split the country’s elite into different factions,” Der Spiegel commented.
“Knocking down Luzhkov presents a danger to the entire political and economic structure in Russia,” said Alexei Bayer in the Moscow Times. “For the past decade Russia has been producing massive corruption, successfully turning top government officials and well-connected entrepreneurs into Forbes A-list billionaires.” The political system was tightly and rigidly interlinked with this officially sanctioned sleaze, he said. “If such an important, huge link in the corrupt chain as the city of Moscow is tinkered with, the entire state edifice might come tumbling down.”
Oh well, these predictions apparently are knocking at the door…