Meet the Old Boss, Georgy Boos
16 Aug 2010
Kaliningrad Governor Georgy Boos is out. This morning, United Russia unveiled its shortlist for governor candidates (from which Medvedev will select the oblast’s next leader), and Mr. Boos’ name was not on it.
Until just last week, most observers (including people who hated Boos) were confident that the governor would receive another term, despite mass protests earlier this year that were hugely embarrassing for the Kremlin and Russia’s most powerful political party. The likely media reaction to Boos’ ousting now will be to credit the opposition with having pressured a compromise from the president, whose office appointed Boos five years ago. Indeed, Vladimir Milov and Boris Nemtsov rushed to their LiveJournal blogs with updates. Nemtsov proclaimed it “a serious victory for the opposition,” whereas Milov qualified his celebration somewhat, saying “this is a big victory for the Kaliningrad opposition” (my emphasis).
So why did Boos lose his job?
Unpopularity. Undeniably, one of the reasons Boos fell out of favor with the Kremlin was his extraordinary unpopularity with his electorate. In a June 2010 poll, 57% of the local population supported his resignation (though only 8% expected it). Despite summer successes preventing mass rallies, initial failures at the beginning of the year made Boos a liability and a symbol of the shortcomings and unaccountability of the unelected governor appointment system. As a simple matter of political theater, the Kremlin made the smart, albeit painful, decision to jettison the Kaliningrad dead weight. Now the party can claim that it responds to the will of the people (while it quietly appoints another apparatchik).
Powerful enemies. But even the shame of last winter’s demonstrations was not enough by itself to get Boos kicked out of office. To explain that, we need to consider more recent events. Over the past few weeks, two independent scandals involving the governor have surfaced — and they both suggest that Boos made enemies of political actors with far greater power than anyone like Boris Nemtsov or Vladimir Milov.
The first incident involved Boos’ military epaulets. In December 2007, the Ministry of Defense awarded him the rank of ‘Colonel.’ Then, last year, Boos attended a May 9th Victory Day celebration in military uniform wearing his ‘colonel’ shoulder ornaments. As a result, someone initiated an official investigation into Boos’ military record. This process lasted an entire year. More than two months ago, the case was concluded, with the Defense Ministry determining that Boos had been illegally promoted from ‘captain’ to ‘lieutenant colonel’ in 2000 (when he was serving in the Duma). That promotion and his later bump to ‘colonel’ were invalidated and “the appropriate measures” were taken against those responsible for the whole thing.
Then just a few days ago — a week before the Kremlin needed to decide whether or not to reappoint Kaliningrad’s governor — the media suddenly caught wind of this story, and Boos’ name was dragged back into the mud a calm summer had seemed to shake off.
Also last week, the press learned that local Interior Ministry police have opened a criminal investigation into possible embezzlement and theft in Mr. Boos’ government. Raiding the offices of the ‘Fund for Housing and Social Construction,’ officers seized documents that allegedly prove the theft of 89 million rubles (2.9 million USD) from the state budget.
In the words of ‘Petersburg Fund’ president Mikhail Vinograd, “Mr. Boos’ competitor has a very strong lobby. The battle between them will go until the last man standing.” Boos appears to have lost that battle, but it was against forces with extensive political connections. It was this “competition” (not the liberal opposition) that seems to have played the biggest role in unseating Kaliningrad’s governor.
United Russia on the Defensive. Just a few days ago, one could find people like Kaliningrad oppositionist Solomon Ginzburg, who told Gazeta.ru that the military rank scandal could never cost Boos his job. “This ‘joker’ was thrown in to complicate the process of his reappointment,” he said, “and it’s no coincidence that it was kept hidden until the last minute. It’s clear that Boos didn’t assign himself the promotion — this is done by the Ministry of Defense, who’s now caught its mistake.”
But now that United Russia has indeed decided against nominating Boos for a second term, the opposition is eager to claim credit for having forced a reckoning in the halls of power.
Not one to be caught off guard again by anti-vlast’ sentiment from Kaliningrad, United Russia delivered its announcement about Boos’ ouster alongside a media blitz of explanations about why it booted Boos and denials that it did so to please the opposition. In an amusing triumph of tongue-in-cheek, Pavel Salin compared liberals like Nemtsov and Milov to Georgy Boos himself, saying that they were “trying to wear someone else’s epaulets.” Aleksei Chadaev went one step further and compared Nemtsov to Doku Umarov, the infamous terrorist who has been criticized for claiming responsibility for terrorist attacks in which he likely had very little involvement.
United Russia has also taken upon itself the difficult task of explaining this move as a reflection of the party’s commitment to democracy. Viacheslav Volodin, Secretary of the Presidium of the party’s General Council, declared in fine Orwellian speak, “for us, the opinion of the voters is law.” While this principle has apparently not motivated the EdRosy to push for the return of direct elections for governors, Volodin does insist that “President Medvedev has repeatedly stated that the level of popular support is one of the main criteria for evaluating the work of governors.” Dmitri Orlov told reporters that Boos lost the support of the citizenry, but highlighted that such things happen “even in perfectly benign conditions,” again seeming to play up the normality of United Russia’s split with Boos.
Perhaps in order to save face (or maybe because he still has a few well-placed friends left), the party leadership promised Boos another job soon. “We’re sure that his experience and knowledge will be in demand in a senior position at the federal level,” Head of the Central Executive Committee, Andrei Vorob’ev, told the media.
As for the four candidates who did make the list of possible Kaliningrad governors: one is a former mayor of Kaliningrad and another is the current mayor of Kaliningrad. Clearly, the opposition has delivered a “revolution” in the most literal sense of the word.



Aug 16, 2010 @ 23:56:56
Nice job covering what could end up being a game changer in Russian regional politics. Perhaps the EdRossy will shop for governors among regional elites and think twice before appointing apparatchiki from the capitals, particularly in regions where civil society is not in deep hibernation.
The opposition will surely claim this as a feather in their collective cap even though it is a credit to local activism in Kaliningrad. While other forces were surely at play, such as those you mention above or the idea that firing Boos discredits Luzhkov, I find the pubic push back satisfying.
Aug 17, 2010 @ 13:26:25
Agreed that they should have used local elites from the start.
There is the downside, however, that this just means it will be the local elites who are chewed up and spit out by a system designed to dump all the blame on the governors. They’re hated from day one for being unelected, and it’s only a matter of time before the Kremlin has to throw voters a bone by tossing them out. This, I think, will remain true despite Volodin’s and Gryzlov’s recent declarations that “the voters’ will trumps all.”
Oleg Kashin is already mourning poor Aleksandr Yaroshuk…
Aug 17, 2010 @ 14:59:37
“They’re hated from day one for being unelected”
You really think that it bothers common folks so much? The only difficulty with governor appointment is that all issues between a new governor and local power brokers should be worked out AFTER his appointment, as opposed to election, where all candidates usually clear their stance with local heavyweights long beforehand. But no politician is an enemy to himself, they understand that their rating can be brought down in a matter of months, so it’s much easier to reach some kind of agreement than wage a full-scale war with even single power group. The fact that a governor was appointed is just one more argument against him, nothing more.
I agree that voters tend to become dissatisfied with any authority, it’s just human nature. But this affects both elected and appointed officials and consequences are roughly the same: they don’t get reappointed or reelected.
Aug 17, 2010 @ 15:53:31
I’m not sure why some Russian governors lose office. With Boos, I think his success upsetting local elites (not so much voters) seems to have played a special role in his ouster. That’s why I wrote this post highlighting the recent scandals, which I think demonstrate a conflict within Kaliningrad’s establishment. The public protests are not irrelevant, but I do think their political power is hugely exaggerated.
As for the differences between appointments vs elections, well, consider this: the new candidates for Boos’ job are from the same party. They were nominated by the same party arbitrators, and the final lucky guy will be picked by the same federal office. I’m sure Medvedev will try his best to accommodate “the opinion of voters” (it being “law” and all), but surely a more efficient way to honor that opinion would be to simply hold a popular election. What we get instead is an imitation of accountability. It’s not always bad (voters, of course, often choose horrible candidates — especially in an era of mass media and thirty-second slogans), but I think we’re kidding ourselves if we decide to pretend that it’s no different from an election-based system.
Aug 17, 2010 @ 16:19:11
Yes, I can’t agree more with you regarding appointment/election. It’s understandable why the Kremlin decided to use an appointment system (it was extremely hard to get rid of some pesky wilful boyars; even now, look how cautiously Shaymiev or Rahimov were tamed, for example), but a much more effective and elegant system could be implemented. It’s quite obvious now that practically everyone has grown tired of the United Russia. Russia is in dire need of a second big, more liberal party.
Aug 18, 2010 @ 05:09:01
“You really think that it bothers common folks so much?”
I happened to be in Bashkiria around the time when Rahimov was replaced. Everyone was talking about it and I got a strong impression that people were very unhappy about the manner in which it was done, no matter what was their opinion about Rahimov or the new guy (Khamitov). They were cynically saying that Rahimov must have angered ‘the Moscow Tsars’ so they got rid of them quietly, in the middle of holiday period, and Kurultai agreed to the new candidate much too quickly, which was highly suspicious etc.
Aug 18, 2010 @ 10:22:27
You probably know the specifics of Tatarstan’s and Bashkiria’s situations. Rahimov was in the seat since 1993, Shaymiev – since 1991. Both Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are quite rich regions, an overwhelming majority of businesses is concentrated in the hands of national clans. It’s clear that they were extremely worried about any power transition, a very delicate system of preferences and counterbalances had been firmly established for such a long period. Reaching a compromise with the Kremlin and showing their strength were vital, the only possible way to do it was to demonstrate the ability to incite instability. I would say the Kremlin has handled this issue surprisingly well, both the transitions seem to be seamless so far.
Aug 18, 2010 @ 19:50:57
On a related issue – I hope you did not miss the yesterday’s LJ “gubernatorial” hit
http://www.newsru.com/russia/17aug2010/psk.html
A linked page http://www.newsru.com/russia/18feb2009/molclass.html (if read carefully) may give some insight on the logic behind the selection (i.e. a la Borges)
And “kovane” – could you give a bit more detail why appointing the governors was better than local election, please?
I thought of the positive side of it only as a means of consolidating control in view of dangerous direction the US policy towards Russia took at that time (~2005?). (note, I was observing the situation from Australia and did not follow the official Russian media at that time, so my opinion was in a sense independent).
Aug 18, 2010 @ 20:13:39
Igor, thanks for the link. I did follow this as it happened on Kashin’s LJ. Someone actually hacked Turchak’s official site yesterday morning to rename his title “сраный губернатор,” which amused me personally very much.
Aug 19, 2010 @ 12:45:05
Igor, AU,
I’m by no means Putin’s right hand, so I can only guess what he had in mind, but here’s my take:
During Eltsin’s rule, he famously said “Take as much sovereignty as you want”. And most of the then governors did. Take aforementioned Tatarstan for example.
http://compromat.ru/page_10404.htm
Here’s a good article, describing a situation usual for most regions (it’s just more distinct in national republics). Their economy is still very poorly diversified, so often, a majority of the economy is controlled by a few barons. They have money, administrative resource and the police is in their pocket. Needless to say that candidates very loyal to them are elected. When Moscow money started flowing back in the regions, this problem became intolerable, so the Kremlin stepped in. Of the handful of possible solutions, Putin chose the simplest one, to appoint governors. But I think that it’s only good as a temporary measure, and will be harmful in the long run. A more acceptable and safe approach would be returning of elections with the condition that every candidate must be a member of one of two or three large parties.
Aug 20, 2010 @ 02:20:25
Thanks – impressive article – shows how inefficient the bad Soviet “communist” system was ..I think that the debuilders on 90s intentionally forgot the essential part of any “wild west” capitalism – legalization of fire arms for the population.
The appointment system, of course, assumes that the center is better than provinces. I also see a link between centralizing the police control (i.e. removing control on the police from the local administration) and the elections of the local government. It would help too if there were a specific law explicitly forbidding police to approach any demonstrations – approved or not – for the purposes other than checking documents (excepting criminal behavior).
Anyway, I was going to write about the necessity of constitutional separation of business and the government for a long time already – maybe this could put some sense in the f…d “libertarian” capitalism?
Aug 20, 2010 @ 04:14:47
Sorry – I was in a hurry & the previous reply to “kovane” may came out a bit too condensed (not counting grammar
. If relevance of various parts is not obvios, I can explain them separately.
Cheers