Will Nurgaliev Be Next to Order?
A couple of weeks ago, I took some time to examine the important bits that did and didn’t make it into the FSB reforms that were eventually signed into law by President Medvedev. In that same spirit, I’d now like to turn to the latest splash in Russia’s world of legalism: the Federal Law Project ‘On the Police.’
For those who don’t already know, the Law on the Police is a 57-clause proposal from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) that updates the existing militsiia legal code from 1991. The project initially made headlines for two main reasons: (1) the legislation would change the name of the Bolshevik-named ‘milistiia’ (милиция) to the more standard ‘politsiia’ (полиция, or ‘police’), and (2) the entire text of the proposal has been posted online by the government (at http://zakonoproekt2010.ru), in an interface that allows citizens to comment on individual clauses, whether in high praise or sharp criticism. (Most of the commentary appears to be quite negative.)
A quick note about the name change: Medvedev stated publicly that he thinks the time has come to jettison the Soviet legacy that is the ‘militsiia,’ a word used by the Bolsheviks to describe a people’s volunteer force, not a professional police. “The militsiia,” he said, “were vigilantes in epaulets.”
The law is something of a mixed bag. On one hand, there are vaguely-worded new police powers that have alarmed civil rights activists. There is also language in the project that I would describe as amusing window-dressing designed to assuage such worries — mainly codes of conduct relating to good manners and professional behavior. Section 4, Clause 15 is one of the most-commented-on pieces of the zakonoproekt — and understandably so, as it grants police the right to enter homes and search property without either the permission of the owners or a court order (though state prosecutors must be informed within 24 hours). Here is my full translation of the Clause 15:
Chapter IV. The police use of individual measures of state coercion
Article 15. Entering residences and other real estate.
1. The police have the right, at any hour of the day, to freely enter or infiltrate residences and other premises belonging to citizens and premises located on land owned or occupied by organizations. If necessary, [they have the right] to damage any locking devices, components, and structures that might impede their entrance into any containers, vessel-like objects, and vehicles (not including areas, facilities, and vehicles belonging to diplomatic missions and consular offices of foreign states). The police can examine these items:
1) in direct pursuit of criminal suspects, fugitives from bodies of inquiry and preliminary investigation, and persons escaping criminal sentences;
2) if there are sufficient grounds to believe that a crime or accident has occurred on the premises, or that a person there resides in a state of helplessness, or in order to detain anyone described in Paragraph 1 of this Article, to suppress a crime or provide assistance to victims;
3) in the event of natural disasters, catastrophes, accidents, epidemics, epizootic outbreaks, mass riots, or other emergencies directly threatening the lives and health of citizens or property, for the provision of security for individuals, society, and the state.
2. In exercising powers relating to limitations on citizens’ rights to the inviolability of their homes, a police officer must:
1) before entering a home, inform the citizens living there about the reasons for entry;
2) after entering into a home against the will of its residents, employ safe means and methods to respect and honor their dignity, lives, and health, and avoid unnecessary damage to their property;
3) not disclose private information learned in the course of entering a citizen’s home;
4) inform [his or her] immediate supervisor and submit a report about entering a home without the residents’ permission.
3. Within 24 hours, the police must inform the state prosecutor about any cases of home entry without the permission of the residents.
Section 6, Clause 22, Paragraph 1, Subsection 1 has been another headlines-grabber. This language actually lays out restrictions on what parts of the body a police officer may legally beat a Russian citizen:
“In an officer’s application of special means, the following restrictions exist: he is prohibited from striking a person with a rubber nightstick on the head, the neck, the clavicle, the stomach, the genitals, or the area of the heart — and he is prohibited from striking the same area of the body multiple times.”
In Section 9, Clause 50, Paragraph 4, police retained the right to commandeer vehicles and property, despite a public scandal last March, when traffic police attempted a roadblock using private cars and then refused to pay the owners compensation for ether damages or life endangerment on the grounds that the suspect escaped:
“Logistical support for the police [...] The police may take from citizens and organizations possessing or using vehicles and other property necessary to carry out duties in accordance with the civil laws of the Russian Federation. Federal executive authorities in the Internal Affairs [Department] will determine the conditions for exercising this right over vehicles and property.”
It’s not all about powers, though. Section 4, Clause 14, Paragraph 4 will be of interest to the Strategy-31 protesters, so fond of getting arrested at Triumfal’naia Square. Russia takes a step closer to Miranda Rights with this proposal:
“An individual detained is entitled in accordance with federal laws to the services of a lawyer and a translator from the moment he or she is placed in a specially assigned area.”
In the bill, there is also some extremely noble — if equally toothless — rhetoric in support of increased accountability. “An officer will apologize to a citizen whose rights and freedoms have been violated” (says Section 2, Clause 9, Paragraph 5) and “the opinion of citizens regarding police actions” would become “the basic criteria for the formal evaluation of the police’s work” (says Section 2, Clause 9, Paragraph 8).
Aleksei Nikol’skii and Liliia Biriukovka, writing in Vedomosti, were not impressed by the Clause 9 provisions. Instead, they probed the economic sphere of the law, pointing out that — despite the Kremlin’s much vaunted campaign to make the MVD an entirely federally funded operation, governors and regional leaders will still be able to influence the police by paying cash bonuses and providing subsidized apartments. The new law upholds a ban on officers owning commercial enterprises, but it fails to close an existing loophole on the exact definition of what constitutes such holdings. Despite a long history of police-involved extortion rackets, Section 3, Clause 13, Paragraph 31 includes as one of the police’s rights: “the right to participate in tax audits when required by the Russian Federation’s tax bodies.” According to Nikol’skii and Biriukovka, the overseer of the Department of Economic Security in the MVD, Evgenii Shkolov, personally insisted on preserving this power. (And he got is way, in this draft anyway.)
In a separate piece, the Vedomosti editorial staff accused the president of failing to deliver on past promises:
“The president pledged to free the police from superfluous functions — but this hasn’t happened: still remaining is vehicle inspections, and driver licensing, and migration control, and private-contracted police units, and the opportunity to participate in economic disputes. [And] a new power to prevent extremism has appeared.”
This last sentence refers to Section 3, Clause 12, Paragraph 1, Subsection 14, which reads:
“The police have the following responsibilities: [...] to employ measures in accordance with federal law aimed at preventing extremism, detecting and suppressing the extremist activities of public and religious associations and other organizations and citizens.”
This responsibility to “prevent extremism” echoes the controversial purpose of last month’s FSB law, which applied not to the police but Russia’s special security agency (whose clearest American parallel would be the CIA). Rashid Nurgaliev, the Minister of the Interior and one of the chief architects of the MVD draft legislation, told reporters that the project embodies “the development of the idea of humanizing the forms and methods of police work. Precaution and the prevention of crimes are the main activities [of the police], and officers’ resort to force will only be permitted in instances when nonviolent methods do not enable them to complete their duties.”
The recent flood of legal reforms to Russia’s police and security apparatuses would seem to constitute an important new phase in Dmitri Medvedev’s much-publicized ‘modernization’ campaign — an effort many commentators have foolishly described as Perestroika 2.0. But there are more nuanced ways to understand these developments.
To borrow Professor Mark Galeotti’s interpretation, one possibility here is that Medvedev is moving to assert authority over already-occurring practices (and ongoing abuses of rules) by codifying the status quo, in order to render the MVD and FSB more dependent on his power to allow or disallow certain behavior.
Also possible (and indeed more likely, given the overall weakness of the civil rights safeguards written into the law) is that this first draft of the MVD bill belongs more to the siloviki than Medvedev and his ‘civiliki.’ Nurgaliev represents powerful interests in the Kremlin, and perhaps he and his allies are making the same play that the FSB’s leaders did in July. This would certainly explain why the legislation’s human-rights-friendly provisions are so thoroughly cosmetic.
The question then is whether or not the president and his ‘lawyers clan’ will back off from another confrontation, or if they will mount an effort to either boost the civil rights aspects of the MVD bill, or — as happened to a limited extent in the Duma with the FSB law — water down the new police powers.
The zakonoproekt will remain open to public comments until September 15th, at which time it returns to the president’s office for revisions. Medvedev has announced that he intends to submit an updated draft to the Duma before the end of the year.
lol @ “Most of the commentary appears to be quite negative.”
in an interface that allows citizens to comment on individual clauses, whether in high praise or sharp criticism.
Didn’t Alexander II do something similar for the abolition of serfdom? Though citizens at that time was highly circumscribed.
Did he? That sounds interesting.
Speaking of the citizens participating in this, I wonder if the MVD will pay them or their property a visit once all is settled and done. Or maybe the state doesn’t care. Something tells me the hosts are keeping a record of domestic IP addresses viewing the site.
He did, sort of. He asked noble assemblies to discuss how emancipation should be carried out and send their proposals to St. P, and lifted censorship about abolition in the press. In true Russian fashion he also called on the police to monitor those who were getting too carried away with the idea. Interestingly, at the time this process was called glasnost.
You must be mistaken. Glasnost happened in the 1980s and 1990s and has no historical precedents, as it’s a singular moment in super duper moral human development. Angels cried and God experienced his favorite bowel movement ever. It was the best of times, and freedom saved everyone from everything. (Liberty helped too.)
Sean,
they were nobility assemblies, basically representing only one side of the reform. No wonder the reform turned out to be so irrational and one-sided, it laid the foundation for Russia’s consequent economic hardships and revolutions. And yes, not all peasants had Internet at the times.
The emancipation of the serfs laid the foundation for economic hardships? Harder than being a serf?
The difference here seems to be that anybody with actual power already had their powwow and drafted their proposals. Now the thing is before the dusty masses, where it’s being trampled by all manner of legally-curious persons. When it goes back to Medvedev, he’ll have enough different voices to simply find in the chatter any of the minor tweaks and moderations that he’d have added himself.
Also, nobody had to lift any Internet censorship since none exists on the RuNet. What’s novel is bothering to run it by the public at all.
But unless Medvedev cites the online comments to drastically rewrite the legislation, I think Alexander’s little experiment remains the bolder of the two.
Believe it or not, the emancipation of the serfs was carried out in such the way that there was the widespread sentiment among the peasants that their state had worsened after the reform. Under its provisions, the former serfs had to buy out land from landlords. Needless to say, they weren’t very rich folk, so their only option was to sign lease agreements. And very shackling and extortionate at that. It prevented the formation of large farms, capable of supplying a large amount of food to the market that was needed to feed cities. This contained the growth of a worker class and held back economic development, not to mention the growing dissent and riots among the peasants. Although the reform was certainly a step in the right direction (it provided the peasantry with much needed personal rights), the unwillingness and inability of the authorities to solve this problem was probably the key factor in the revolutions that followed. The nobility just didn’t wanted to make any concessions at all.
As to Medvedev’s reasons for bringing forward the Internet discussion, I think it’ aimed at two goals: first, to polish any minor glitches, and second, to give people a sense of participation, a PR stunt, in other words. In any case, I think that’s a great move.
Comparing Medvedev’s and Alexander’s balls size is an excellent thesis subject I think
Your serfdom to indentured servitude to food shortages sounds like one of many long-term factors that contributed to the collapse of tsarist Russia. Your narrative leaves out a little thing called WWI, but lord knows the Germans have enough to feel guilty about as it is.
Two questions: (1) what might Medvedev determine to be “minor glitches” in this legislation? And (2) why do you think this is good PR if a majority of the comments are negative?
Many factors contributed to the collapse, WWI being the major catalyst. But I tend to see the roots of important historical events from the economic point of view, be it the collapses of Russian Empire or the USSR. The causes of the Russian Revolution are numerous indeed (Nicholas II’s unbelievably stupid policies, shootings of peaceful demonstrations, the Russian-Japanese war, undermining respect to the Czar’s power, firing workers of Putilov’s plant, and very successful actions of the Bolshevik party) but they would have mattered much less if Russia had been a economically prosperous nation.
Concerning your question:
1) Internet users have already pointed out a few major shortcomings of the law, for instance the right of the police to enter citizen’s houses without a court order or the rather strange clause, demanding that a policeman has to apologize for any violation of the law. A law that allows its violation is a nonsense. If Medvedev considers this as “minor glitches’ or intended features is an entirely different question.
2) I wouldn’t call a majority of the comments negative, they criticize specific articles in a constructive way, users were asked to do that actually. Most of the truly negative comments are deleted anyway I guess. You don’t agree that allowing citizens to participate in the preparation of a new law is a democratic and good move? Of course, it depends on how the comments will be handled. If they are shrugged off, the whole idea will be viewed as a pure farce and bad PR.
I think you raise an interesting quetion: How much of this will Medvedev answer in his revisions, once the bill is returned to his office? He could very well say “the people don’t like Clause 15, so it’s being amended to say that a warrant is always needed.” That would be a huge thing, I think.
If there had been a similar public (nonbinding) referendum on the FSB law, and the amenders had cited the masses’ objections to the pieces of the law that were eventually tossed out — that too would have been a huge thing.
So, I agree that there is potential for some very interesting politics ahead. We’ll see.
Let’s not get all crazy here. First of all, all the comments undergo premoderation. So the most deranged (or the most inconvenient) ones don’t even appear. I can recollect only a handful of stories when internet users were prosecuted for their posts (most of them under the infamous 282 article, hate speeches). And I guess that was initiatives of some local MVD bigwigs. Most of them received a wide coverage in the media. In this case, a possible uncomfortable comment concerns the whole MVD, no one would risk their asses trying to intimidate some internet user after he has posted it.
I agree, but I do think IP addresses are being logged and a database assembled. I’m sure the FBI or CIA would do the same.
I don’t think I’m making a revelation here, but any modern CMS logs IP-addresses today. LJ and WordPress included.
Very cute.
btw, the “vigilantes in epaulets” sounds suspiciously similar to Chichvarkin’s phrase – “werewolves in epaulets”
A hidden message maybe?
Perhaps, beset by the siloviki, Medvedev is taking his modernization campaign underground. Next thing you know, you’ll need a secret decoder ring to untangle his latest speech in favor of the rule of law.
decoder ring you say? – http://picasaweb.google.com/lh/photo/HnGGHPhWgvK_L6KaCvaDLQ?feat=directlink
I see I’m not the only shoop-da-woop game in town…
I like the latter interpretation. DAM says he want police reform, but he is being ignored by MVD officials. So he tells them to draft a proposal. Perhaps in combo with Justice dept.
The rules of politics require DAM to take full responsibility for the law proposal. Press and public scream Russian politics needs more plurality, but when a leader would admit he is only partly in control, he is written off as a puppet. What’s more, if he would make it official that this law is submitted by MVD, there would be no discussion of content at all. ‘Civil society’ would have all the argument_ it needs to be against.
DAM then tries to enlist the public/society to criticize the law proposal, providing him with support to either make amendments or order a new proposal.
But as often it proves difficult for Russia’s cynical society to perform their civic duties. They have been disappointed so many times that they just don’t see a chance to discuss content when they get one.
What Medvedev mostly gets is one-sided criticism, meaning ‘the philosophy behind the proposal is wrong’, and sarcasm about the name change. Not really the material he may use to make the MVD sign up to provisions that cut into their power.
I think the ire directed at specific clauses and subsections would be enough for him to toss out certain aspects of the law, much in the way he or his allies may have done with the FSB law (I can’t say for certain that this was his initiative, but it certainly fits his modus operandi).
The real question seems to be whether or not Medvedev and his people feel up to another fight with the siloviki, who are clearly authoring this legislation in its first drafts, at least.
I like very much your analysis of civil society “having all the argument it needs” as a disincentive for the president being more honest about his role.
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No WW I, no likely Bolshevik takeover of Russia – a view shared by a good number of folks.
While having a growing industrial base PRIOR to WW I, Russia was ripe for some noticeable changes, which few seem to disagree with.
The Russo-Japanese War was a foolish war, which in itself didn’t play a major contributing role in the eventual Bolshevik success.
Mikhail,
You’re right, Russia was developing at the time, the problem was that it was developing much more slowly that other industrial states. If memory serves the number of workers increased from 1,5% in 1900 to 2% in 1915, while Germany already had 20% in 1905. The Russian empire was also plagued by peasant riots (their number had grown rapidly throughout 1900-1917) and emerging nationalism of republics along the edges. While I agree that WWI contributed greatly to the success of the Bolsheviks, there were too many people opposed to solving the agrarian question, and I think that a revolution was imminent. Maybe it wouldn’t have been so violent as the Revolution was, but Russia didn’t have a chance to continue developing in the state it was in the beginning of 20th century.
Keeping in mind that the democracies of the time operated noticeably different from their present standing.
Prior to WW I, change appeared probable enough, but not one where the Bolsheviks would likely prevail (IMO and that of some others). Offhand, I think there’s a quote from Lenin suggesting such.
In terms of overall economic development: over the course of time, there’ve been statistical comparisons noting an advancing Russian economy in the 50 years or so prior to WW I – albeit problematical in relation to varying socioeconomic factors evident.
Agree that a smaller Russia was eventually going to happen regardless of WW I happening.
As is, the Russian Empire had a good historical run. Contrary to some of the views out there, Russia’s re-adopting of the tri-color and two headed eagle serves as an acknowledgement that Russia had a pre-1917 past which wasn’t all bad.
@ AGT:
Good article! You wrote about the FSB: “… whose clearest American parallel would be the CIA”. IMHO thats not correct. It would be the FBI. Both agencys have law enforcement and intelligence roles.
About section 4, clause 15 of the draft: I think it is good. Our police laws here in Germany are more lax about that topic.
With everybody spying on everybody, I lose track of who’s doing what!
A good summary. The mere fact of presenting the project for discussion is IMHO some step forward. Looking at both – the one Medvedev pushed through (FSB) and this “police” draft, I wonder how some items were not found to contradict Russian Constitution e.g. articles 22,25 and 118 (in case of FSB bew right to judge). It is particularly surprising because Medvedev has a law degree (although in private law).
On the overall usefulness of the reform…This paper in Law & Society Review
http://tinyurl.com/3a5fvk6
argues that police in Russia conforms to a “predatory” functional model (i.e. different from both the”functionalist” and “divided society” models in that it is able to act as an **independent** active rent-seeking agent). Which means that to reform the police, one has to have a structure with overriding power. FSB? The modified police law if this is the intention will then try to reduce the ability of the police to act independently. Unfortunately, with the current level of corruption in MVD, the Georgian way of reforming the police it seems is the only one to go. (excluding a simpler and cleaner way )
Guys you have no idea how much militia is hated in Russia. The only reason for this “public discussion” is to stage a show which would give some a sense of involvement. This is a PR stunt and a rebranding campaign presented as a reform. However they chose the wrong word to whitewash the militsiya: the word politsiya has bad (or even worse) connotations, see e.g. this WWII german propaganda video advertising “our new police” on the occupied territories. the police was staffed by locals cooperating with the fascist authorities, and called “polizei”. If the militsiya is renamed, no doubt police officers will be called polizei!
http://video.yandex.ru/users/dieman7ich/view/591